A white teacher at a predominantly black public middle school in South Carolina prevailed in her civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against school officials and a school district, based on racial harassment in the workplace. Kandrac v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., No. 2:04-CV-23318-DCN (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2007) (order and opinion denying defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law). Unlike the more common situation in which the harassers at work are fellow employees or supervisors, in this case the harassers were students at the school. On a regular basis they subjected the plaintiff to hostile and obscene insults of a racial nature. School officials, who also were black, acknowledged a problem but basically claimed that they were powerless to do anything about it. There may be some cases in which school officials may not be found liable where they try unsuccessfully to control injurious student behavior, but this was not such a case. The defendants had the ability to exercise significant control over their students, but they failed even to take reasonable corrective measures.

The defendants took the position that racial harassment of teachers at the school was so pervasive that black, as well as white, teachers were commonly subjected to it and that, therefore, the plaintiff could not make out a claim based on the racially hostile environment in which she was made to work. In upholding a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court rejected the argument for two reasons. First, there was evidence that, in fact, "racial" statements directed at other black individuals by black students were not racially motivated, unlike the slurs directed at the plaintiff and some other white teachers. Second, the defendants had incorrectly assumed that racial slurs could not be directed at both whites and blacks because of their race.

Where the workplace is permeated with racially discriminatory ridicule, intimidation, and insult sufficiently severe and pervasive as to alter the conditions of a victim's employment and create an abusive work environment, Title VII is violated. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101 (2002). That the racially harassing conduct may be so pervasive as to be directed at members of different races does nothing to change the fact that the rights of a particular victim of such harassment have been violated. To demonstrate a racially hostile environment, an employee who was the subject of the complained-of conduct must show (1) that such conduct was unwelcome; (2) that it was based on race; (3) that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive; and (4) that there is some basis for imposing liability on the employer. Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. , 383 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2004). There is no requirement that the plaintiff show that no person of another race was also subjected to racial harassment. If other employees of a race different from the plaintiff's, such as black teachers at the school in Kandrac, happen also to have been subjected to a racially hostile environment, there is no reason why this should preclude, or otherwise adversely affect the plaintiff's claim.

It has been said that there is no hostile work environment claim where harassing behavior is borne equally by employees of all races. Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 931 F. Supp. 773, 816 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (citing Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776, 778 (5th Cir. 1983) (no sex or race harassment claim where manager treated all assistant managers with "measured disdain")). Importantly, however, this principle assumes that, unlike in Kandrac, there is nothing to indicate that the abusive or hostile conduct directed at the plaintiff, in particular, had a racial motive behind it. Thus, in Dudley, for example, the court underscored the fact that the plaintiff simply was treated harshly in the same manner as employees of all races and that the complained-of conduct was "unaccompanied by any racially opprobrious language or conduct." Id. at 816.

By contrast, in Kandrac, the plaintiff at trial proved conduct directed at her that was heavily laden with racial hostility and invective. Her claim was not diminished if others, including black teachers, were subjected to similar treatment. To conclude otherwise would be tantamount to immunizing an employer from liability as long as the employer allows the racially hostile atmosphere to injure enough of its employees, including employees of different races.