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    TRUSTS & ESTATES, WILLS, AND TAX LAW UPDATE

    Gale Burns

    Recent Posts

    TRUSTS & ESTATES AND TAX LAW UPDATE: IRS Recognition of a Postmortem Modification or Reformation of a Decedent's Trust

    Posted by Gale Burns on Tue, Mar 19, 2013 @ 13:03 PM

    March 26, 2013

    Brad Pettit, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

    The Uniform Trust Code ("U.T.C.") provides that a "court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement."  U.T.C. § 415 (Thomson Reuters, Westlaw current through 2011 annual meetings of the Nat'l Conf. of Comm'r on Unif. State Laws & A.L.I.) (emphasis added).  More specifically, the U.T.C. states that "[t]o achieve the settlor's tax objectives, [a] court may modify the terms of a trust in a manner that is not contrary to the settlor's probable intention[, and a] court may provide that the modification has retroactive effect."  Id. § 416 (emphasis added).  The comment to section 416 seeks to explain the subtle distinctions between a court's discretionary power (1) under section 415 to approve the reformation of an irrevocable trust to conform to the settlor's intention by correcting a mistake of fact or law, and (2) under section 416 to modify an irrevocable trust in order to achieve the settlor's tax objectives:

    "Modification" under this section is to be distinguished from the "reformation" authorized by Section 415. Reformation under Section 415 is available when the terms of a trust fail to reflect the donor's original, particularized intention. The mistaken terms are then reformed to conform to this specific intent. The modification authorized here allows the terms of the trust to be changed to meet the settlor's tax‑saving objective as long as the resulting terms, particularly the dispositive provisions, are not inconsistent with the settlor's probable intent. The modification allowed by this subsection is similar in concept to the cy pres doctrine for charitable trusts (see Section 413), and the deviation doctrine for unanticipated circumstances (see Section 412).

    Id. § 416 cmt.

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    Topics: legal research, trusts & estates, postmortem modification or reformation of decedent, evidence of testator's intent, Brad Pettit, tax

    WiLLS: Will Substitutes—Duplication of Gift

    Posted by Gale Burns on Fri, Feb 22, 2013 @ 11:02 AM

    The Lawletter Vol 37 No 12

    Jim Witt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

    With the proliferation of will substitutes (vehicles such as revocable trusts, IRAs, and pensions, used to pass assets to beneficiaries at the owner's death but outside the will), a problem can arise with possible duplication between the will substitute and the will. Such a problem was litigated in the Court of Appeals of South Carolina case, Estate of Gill ex rel. Grant v. Clemson University Foundation, 725 S.E.2d 516 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012).

    In Estate of Gill, the testatrix bequeathed $100,000 to Clemson University to establish the "Scholarship." The income earned by the fund (but none of the principal) was to be used to provide scholarships for "academically deserving football players." Almost one year after executing the will, the testatrix established an IRA with Morgan Stanley. She specifically designated the Scholarship as the beneficiary of $100,000 in the IRA. The Estate contended that her intent had been to provide a funding mechanism for the Scholarship under the will, not for Clemson to receive two separate $100,000 gifts. Clemson contended that it was entitled to both the $100,000 from the IRA and the $100,000 bequest under the will.

    The Estate brought suit for a declaratory judgment, and a special referee found that because the will was unambiguous as to the $100,000 bequest to establish the Scholarship, the bequest was not ambiguous and extrinsic evidence could not be considered. The referee therefore ruled that Clemson was entitled to both the $100,000 Scholarship bequest and $100,000 from the IRA as a nontestamentary asset passing outside the will.

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    Topics: legal research, wills, The Lawletter Vol 37 No 12, substitute vehicles to pass assets, if other method is used to transfer gift intent sh, Jim Witt

    TRUSTS & ESTATES: Creation of Beneficial Interests Through Adult Adoption

    Posted by Gale Burns on Mon, Jan 28, 2013 @ 12:01 PM

    The Lawletter Vol 37 No 11

    Matt McDavitt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

    The situation occasionally arises wherein one or more parties interested in a decedent's estate or trust challenge the right of certain other beneficiaries to take via the will or trust on the ground that these other beneficiaries were allegedly recently adopted through adult adoption for the express purpose of creating a beneficial interest in the estate or trust.  Two recent opinions reveal the factors reviewing courts examine to resolve such claims, which, if proven true, would amount to fraudulent interference with a gift or inheritance.

    In Otto v. Gore, 45 A.3d 120 (Del. Super. Ct. 2012), for instance, a woman with three children from her former marriage adopted her 65-year-old ex-husband as her fourth "child."  This adult adoption potentially created an interest in the ex-husband in a family trust created by the woman's parents, a trust granting shares to the settlors' "grandchildren."  The court observed, however, that an ambiguity existed in the trust instrument because, while the descriptor "children" was defined as including adopted children, no such definition was included regarding "grandchildren," so extrinsic evidence was properly examined to determine whether the settlors intended adult adoptees to take.  To find this intent regarding the adoption of grandchildren, the court referenced a letter sent by the settlors to their drafting attorney, which the court interpreted as indicating settlor intent that the class of grandchildren was to include solely minors who had a parent-child relationship with their parents.

    The Otto court concluded that the adult adoption at issue had been effectuated specifically to create an interest in the trust and that, as this intention would have thwarted the settlors' intent to benefit only minor grandchildren in a true parent-child relationship, equity would intervene to prevent the ex-husband's taking under the trust, despite the fact that the adoption complied with state law.

    A contrary result was reached in In re Estate of Fenton, 901 A.2d 455 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).  Whereas the court in Otto examined the timing and impact of the adult adoption to determine whether an ulterior motive demanded that equity prevent that adoption from creating a beneficial interest in the subject trust, the court in Fenton refused to speculate regarding the motives of the adoptive child and/or parent, instead relying on the adoptive mother's own statements in court indicating that she had effectuated the adoption of her 37-year-old second cousin in order to create a close family.

    The Fenton court noted that the adoption was valid under the applicable state law and that the adoption statutes do not demand inquiry as to the purpose of the adoption.  The adult adoption in Fenton created $30,000 in annual income in the adoptee for life.  The court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to offer evidence of an ulterior motive, aside from the circumstantial evidence that the adoption created a substantial interest in the trust, although evidence was developed indicating that the adoptive mother had, prior to the adoption, specifically written to the trustee to see if the adoption would create an interest in her new daughter.

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    Topics: legal research, The Lawletter Vol 37 No 11, Matt McDavitt, estates, beneficial interests through adult adoption, Otto v. Gore, Delware Superior Court, ambiguity in trust instrument required inquiry, In re Estate of Fenton, NJ Superior Court, trust language not ambiguous

    TAX: Expensing the Cost of Developing a Vineyard

    Posted by Gale Burns on Wed, Jan 2, 2013 @ 16:01 PM

    The Lawletter Vol 37 No 10

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    Topics: legal research, Brad Pettit, The Lawletter Vol 37 No 10, vineyard deduction for tangible property, applicable for year placed in service

    The Duty of a Trustee to Diversify Investments

    Posted by Gale Burns on Mon, Nov 5, 2012 @ 09:11 AM

    November 6, 2012

    Brad Pettit, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

    The volatility of stock, bond, and real estate markets, as evidenced by the technology stock and real estate "bubbles" during the last two decades, makes it incumbent upon trust professionals to make sure that they comply with current legal standards for managing and investing trust assets.  The Uniform Trust Code provides generally that a trustee must act "prudently" when administering a trust:

    § 804. Prudent Administration.

    A trustee shall administer the trust as a prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.

    Unif. Trust Code § 804 (U.L.A. 2000 & Westlaw current through 2011 annual meetings of the Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws and A.L.I.).

    The Uniform Prudent Investor Act expressly states that "[a] trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust unless the trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served without diversifying."  Unif. Prudent Investor Act § 3 (U.L.A. 1994 & Westlaw current through 2011 annual meetings of the Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws and A.L.I.) (emphasis added); see also P.G. Guthrie, Annotation, Duty of Trustee to Diversify Investments, and Liability for Failure to Do So, 24 A.L.R.3d 730 (1969 & Westlaw databases updated weekly).  The Restatement of Trusts similarly provides that "[i]n making and implementing investment decisions, the trustee has a duty to diversify the investments of the trust unless, under the circumstances, it is prudent not to do so."  Restatement (Third) of Trusts ["Restatement"] § 90(b) (2007 & Westlaw current through Apr. 2012).

    The Comment to § 3 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act provides two examples of situations in which a trustee's general duty to diversify investments may be less than absolute:

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    Topics: legal research, Brad Pettit, trusts law, investment diversification, prudent investor rule may be enlarged or restricte

    ESTATES: Who Keeps the Ring?—Effect of Termination of Engagement

    Posted by Gale Burns on Mon, Nov 5, 2012 @ 09:11 AM

    The Lawletter Vol 37 No 8

    Jim Witt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

    Perhaps the most obvious legal question that arises when a couple break their engagement is whether the formerly prospective bride, assuming that she has received an engagement ring, is obligated to return it to the formerly prospective groom.  A recent South Carolina appellate case, Campbell v. Robinson, 726 S.E.2d 221 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012), arose out of the broken engagement of Matthew Campbell and Ashley Robinson.  Campbell shows that depending upon the couple's level of rancor, the broken engagement and the question as to ownership of the ring can lead to additional legal issues.

    In the Campbell case, Campbell proposed and presented a ring to Robinson in December 2005.  In a spring 2006 phone conversation, they agreed to postpone the wedding. The engagement was later canceled, and a dispute ensued over ownership of the ring.  Campbell filed suit against Robinson, demanding a jury trial and seeking (1) declaratory judgment that he owned the ring and was entitled to the ring's return or its equivalent value; (2) damages for the ring's wrongful retention; and (3) monetary restitution for the benefit Robinson had received while possessing the ring.  Robinson counterclaimed, based on Campbell's breach of promise to marry, arguing that she was entitled to damages for her prenuptial expenditures, mental anguish, and injury to health.

    Robinson testified that the engagement had been terminated solely by Campbell's action and that after the engagement was canceled, she asked Campbell twice whether she should return the ring.  She asserted that Campbell had told her that she could keep it.  Campbell, in his testimony, denied ending the engagement by himself and contended that the cancellation had been mutual.  He also denied telling Robinson that she could keep the ring.  He further contended that Robinson had refused to give him the ring after he asked for its return.

    The trial court held that (1) South Carolina has not abolished actions for breach of promise to marry, and (2) South Carolina courts hinge postengagement entitlement to the engagement ring upon who was "at fault" for the engagement's cancellation.  Therefore, the trial court ruled that Campbell would be entitled to the return of the ring if Robinson was at fault in terminating the engagement.  If Campbell was at fault, however, Robinson would be entitled to keep the ring, and if Campbell breached the promise to marry, Robinson could recover damages.  The trial court rejected Campbell's argument that he could recover damages on his claims.  The jury found that Campbell was responsible for the termination of the engagement and therefore could not regain possession of the ring.  The jury also found that Robinson was not entitled to any damages for Campbell's breach of promise to marry.

    The court of appeals first dealt with the question of whether South Carolina courts recognize a cause of action for breach of promise to marry.  The court acknowledged that certain heart-balm actions had been abolished in South Carolina, Russo v. Sutton, 422 S.E.2d 750 (S.C. 1992) (the Supreme Court of South Carolina abolished the heart-balm action for alienation of affection), but observed that promise-to-marry actions have not been expressly abolished.  Therefore, the court concluded that Robinson had set forth a valid cause of action for breach of contract to marry.

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    Topics: legal research, estates, Jim Witt, The Lawletter Vol 37 No 8, Campbell v. Robinson, S.C. Supreme Court, implied condition of gift until condition marriage, lack of absolute clear terms as to ownership

    WILLS: The Digital Will

    Posted by Gale Burns on Tue, Oct 16, 2012 @ 15:10 PM

    The Lawletter Vol 37 No 7

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    Topics: legal research, Matt McDavitt, The Lawletter Vol 37 No 7, digital wills, Nevada has codified requirements, execution formalities, electronic signature, authentication characteristic—biometric component, no widespread-use software/hardware available for

    TAX: Recreational and Social Clubs—Loss of Tax Exemption Due to Use by Nonmembers

    Posted by Gale Burns on Mon, Oct 1, 2012 @ 10:10 AM

    The Lawletter Vol 37 No 6

    Brad Pettit, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

    In recent years, recreational and social clubs have experienced declines in membership and the corresponding reductions in revenues that they derive from their members' dues and other payments.  As a result, these clubs have begun allowing nonmembers to use their facilities.  Currently, clubs receive significant revenues from the use of their facilities by nonmembers.  The tax question that arises when a club decides to supplement its income by allowing nonmembers to use its facilities is how much revenue it can receive from nonmembers before it loses its tax-exempt status.

    The Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") provides that "[c]lubs organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, substantially all of the activities of which are for such purposes and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder," 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7) (Westlaw current through P.L. 112‑142 (excluding P.L. 112‑140 and 112‑141) approved 7‑9‑12) (emphasis added), are "exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503," id. § 501(a).  Notwithstanding the "substantially all" language of § 501(c)(7) of the Code, the Treasury Regulations currently state that "[t]he exemption provided by section 501(a) for organizations described in section 501(c)(7) applies only to clubs which are organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes[.] " 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(7)-1(a) (Westlaw current through Sept. 6, 2012; 77 FR 54838) (emphasis added).  The current Regulations also say that "[a] club which engages in business, such as making its social and recreational facilities available to the general public or by selling real estate, timber, or other products, is not organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, and is not exempt under section 501(a)."  Id. § 1.501(c)(7)-1(b) (emphasis added).

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    Topics: legal research, Brad Pettit, The Lawletter Vol 37 No 6, social club tax exemption, § 501 guidelines, 35% limit on outside sources gross receipts

    ESTATES: Escheat of Decedent's Estate

    Posted by Gale Burns on Thu, Aug 16, 2012 @ 12:08 PM

    The Lawletter Vol 37 No 4

    Jim Witt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

    It generally recognized that whether an individual dies intestate, or especially if he or she dies testate, escheat of the decedent's assets to the State is viewed as an absolutely last resort for the distribution of an estate.  See 27A Am. Jur. 2d Escheat § 12 "Generally; escheat disfavored."  Yet, in the recent Nevada case, In re Estate of Melton, 272 P.3d 668 (Nev. 2012), the result was escheat despite the fact that the testator, William Melton ("Bill"), left two wills.

    Bill executed a formal will in 1975 under which he devised most of his estate to his parents, with small portions of the estate going to his brother, Larry J. Melton, and to two of his cousins.  He indicated in this will that his daughter, Vicki Palm ("Vicki"), was to receive nothing.  Bill also left the following handwritten letter, which he had sent to his friend, Alberta Kelleher ("Susie"), in 1995:

    5-15-95

    5:00 AM

    Dear Susie

    I am on the way home from Mom's funeral.  Mom died from an auto accident so I thought I had better leave something in writing so that you Alberta Kelleher will receive my entire estate.  I do not want my brother Larry J. Melton or Vicki Palm or any of my other relatives to have one penny of my estate.  I plan on making a revocable trust at a later date.  I think it is the 15 of [M]ay, no calendar, I think it[']s 5:00 AM could be 7:AM in the City of Clinton Oklahoma.

    Lots of Love

    Bill

    /s/ William E. Melton

    AKA Bill Melton

    [Social security number]

    Id. at 671-72.

    Susie died in 2002, thus predeceasing Bill, who died in 2008.  During the administration of Bill's estate, the existence of his daughter (and only known child), Vicki, was discovered.  Prior to the discovery of the 1975 will, Vicki had argued that the 1995 letter did not qualify as a holographic will and that the estate therefore passed to her by intestate succession.  After the 1975 will was found, Vicki argued that the 1995 letter was a valid will (but that it was ineffective because Susie had predeceased Bill) and that it revoked the 1975 will, thereby giving Vicki the entire estate as Bill's sole heir at law.

    Bill's half sisters, seeking to uphold the 1975 will, argued that the 1995 letter was not a valid will but that if it was valid, it did not revoke the 1975 will.  They further argued that even assuming that the 1995 letter was a valid will that revoked the 1975 will, the revocation had to be disregarded under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, by which a subsequent will, which has no testamentary effect, does not revoke a prior will if it is shown that the testator intended that such revocation be conditioned on the effectiveness of the later will.

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    Topics: legal research, The Lawletter Vol 37 No 4, estates law, Jim Witt, escheat is last resort, In re Estate of Melton, doctrine of dependent relative revocation, disinheritance clause enforceable

    TAX LAW UPDATE: Codification of the "Economic Substance Doctrine"

    Posted by Gale Burns on Mon, Aug 13, 2012 @ 15:08 PM

    August 1, 2012

    Brad Pettit, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

    As part of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Congress codified the long‑standing common‑law doctrine of "economic substance," which is applied in federal income tax cases to prevent taxpayers from trying to claim tax benefits from transactions that have no bona fide nontax purpose.  Pub. L. No. 111‑152, § 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067‑68 (effective with respect to transactions entered into on or after March 31, 2010) (adding subsection (o) to 26 U.S.C. § 7701 and redesignating former subsection (o) as subsection (p)).  The Internal Revenue Code now expressly provides that

    [i]n the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only if—

    (A)       the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and

    (B)       the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.

    26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(1) (Westlaw current through P.L. 112‑90 approved 1‑3‑12).  Section 7701(o) goes on to explain that the term "economic substance doctrine" means the common‑law doctrine under which income tax benefits with respect to a transaction are not allowable if the transaction or series of transactions do not have "economic substance or lack[] a business purpose."  Id. § 7701(o)(5)(A), (D).  It is critical to note that under § 7701(o), there is an "[e]xception for personal transactions of individuals" because Congress expressly provided that the economic substance doctrine is applicable "only to transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in for the production of income."  Id. § 7701(o)(5)(B).

    The Code also makes it clear that a taxpayer can be subjected to "accuracy‑related penalties" if he or she tries to claim tax benefits from a transaction or series of transactions that lack economic substance.  Id. § 6662(b)(6) (subsection (6) added to § 6662(b) by Pub. L. No. 111‑152, § 1409(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1069).  Specifically, the Code now expressly provides that accuracy‑related penalties

    apply to the portion of any underpayment which is attributable to . . . :

     . . . .

    (6)        Any disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance (within the meaning of section 7701(o)) or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law.

    Id.

    On at least three occasions, the U.S. Tax Court has noted that the above‑described provisions of § 7701(o) essentially represent the adoption by Congress of the common‑law doctrine of economic substance as articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 247‑48 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).  Crispin v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2012‑70, T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012‑070, 2012 WL 858406, at *6 n.14; Blum v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2012‑16, T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012‑016, 2012 WL 129801, at *17 n.21; Rovakat, LLC v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2011‑225, T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2011‑225, 2011 WL 4374589, at *27 n.11. 

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    Topics: legal research, Brad Pettit, tax law, economic substance doctrine, no tax benefits for transaction having no business, 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)

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