The Lawletter Vol 39 No 5
Business Law Legal Research Blog
Topics: legal research, Charlene Hicks, contracts, Washington Supreme Court, The Lawletter Vol 39 No 5, arbitration provision, unconscionable, US Supreme Court controversial cases require indiv, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, Stolt Nielsen, 559 U.S. 662, unconscionable claim analyzed under state law, Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enterprises, limits scope of Concepcion and Federal Arbitration
The Lawletter Vol 38 No 4
Under the "first sale doctrine," the owner of a copyrighted item, such as a book or a recording, is free to use it, sell it, lend it, or give it away under whatever conditions the owner chooses to impose. This doctrine derives from a long line of jurisprudence, see Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), and is now embodied in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."). Until now, the extent of the application of the first-sale doctrine to books sold overseas and then imported into the United States remained an open question.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013), has now resolved that question. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., an academic textbook publisher, often assigns to its wholly owned foreign subsidiary (Wiley Asia) rights to publish, print, and sell foreign editions of Wiley's English-language textbooks abroad. Wiley Asia's books state that they are not to be taken (without permission) into the United States. When Supap Kirtsaeng moved from Thailand to the United States to study mathematics, he asked friends and family to buy foreign edition English‑language textbooks in Thai book shops, where they sold at low prices, and to mail them to him in the United States. He then sold the books, reimbursed his family and friends, and kept the profit. Wiley sued Kirtsaeng, claiming copyright infringement.
Wiley prevailed in the district court and in the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court reversed. The majority in a 6-3 decision concluded that nothing in the language of the statute would require that copyrighted works imported from overseas should be treated any differently than goods that are initially sold domestically. Furthermore, as a practical matter, an application of the Copyright Act that would require buyers of copyrighted works to ascertain their provenance is simply unworkable. The volume of foreign trade in which the United States engages is simply too large for enforcement to be feasible. The burden of requiring those importing copyrighted goods into this country for a variety of purposes, such as exhibitions of works of art or acquisitions by museums, to seek out the copyright owners to obtain a license would be onerous. Thus, an interpretation of the Copyright Act that would treat goods initially acquired outside the United States differently from those that are acquired domestically, for purposes of the first-sale doctrine, would be unenforceable.
Topics: legal research, Tim Snider, copyrights, first-sale doctrine, importation, Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 109, owner imposes restrictions, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, imported copyrighted works treated as goods, application of provenance unworkable, importer not immunized from liability for infringe, owner protection narrowed, The Lawletter Vol 38 No 4, U.S. Supreme court
The Lawletter Vol 38 No 2
Some states have statutes prohibiting a merchant from requiring its credit card customers to give or write certain "personal identification information" in a credit card transaction or on a credit card form. For example, pursuant to section 105 of chapter 93 of Massachusetts General Laws, the Massachusetts General Court has declared:
(a) No person, firm, partnership, corporation or other business entity that accepts a credit card for a business transaction shall write, cause to be written or require that a credit card holder write personal identification information, not required by the credit card issuer, on the credit card transaction form. Personal identification information shall include, but shall not be limited to, a credit card holder's address or telephone number. The provisions of this section shall apply to all credit card transactions; provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not be construed to prevent a person, firm, partnership, corporation or other business entity from requesting information [that] is necessary for shipping, delivery or installation of purchased merchandise or services or for a warranty when such information is provided voluntarily by a credit card holder.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, § 105(a). Similarly, California's Song‑Beverly Credit Card Act ("Credit Card Act") provides:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (c), no person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation that accepts credit cards for the transaction of business shall do any of the following:
(1) Request, or require as a condition to accepting the credit card as payment in full or in part for goods or services, the cardholder to write any personal identification information upon the credit card transaction form or otherwise.
(2) Request, or require as a condition to accepting the credit card as payment in full or in part for goods or services, the cardholder to provide personal identification information, which the person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation accepting the credit card writes, causes to be written, or otherwise records upon the credit card transaction form or otherwise.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1747.08(a)(1)-(2).
Several courts have recently considered whether a Zone Improvement Plan code ("ZIP code") constitutes personal identification information. For example, in Pineda v. Williams‑Sonoma Stores, 246 P.3d 612 (Cal. 2011), the California Supreme Court held that a business's act of requesting and recording a cardholder's ZIP code could violate the Credit Card Act and that the customer's ZIP code constituted personal identification information. There, the court explained:
Section 1747.08, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part, "[N]o person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation that accepts credit cards for the transaction of business shall . . . : [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Request, or require as a condition to accepting the credit card as payment in full or in part for goods or services, the cardholder to provide personal identification information, which the person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation accepting the credit card writes, causes to be written, or otherwise records upon the credit card transaction form or otherwise." (§ 1747.08, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) Subdivision (b) defines personal identification information as "information concerning the cardholder, other than information set forth on the credit card, and including, but not limited to, the cardholder's address and telephone number." (§ 1747.08, subd. (b).) Because we must accept as true plaintiff's allegation that defendant requested and then recorded her ZIP code, the outcome of this case hinges on whether a cardholder's ZIP code, without more, constitutes personal identification information within the meaning of section 1747.08. We hold that it does.
March 21, 2013
The advent of a new year marks the introduction of new state legislation that impacts business and commercial transactions, sometimes in significant ways. A few newly enacted statutes that change existing laws and ways of doing business within the state are highlighted below.
On January 1, 2013, Senate Bill 474 came into effect. Under this new law, a construction contract is void if it requires a subcontractor to insure, indemnify, or defend a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor from its own active negligence or willful misconduct, design defects, or claims that do not arise out of the subcontractor's own work. This law effectively eliminates "Type I," or active negligence, indemnity clauses in construction contracts. The law does not affect "Type II," or passive negligence, indemnity clauses, nor does it apply to design professionals.
Also effective on January 1, 2013, Assembly Bill 1396 requires all employee commission agreements to be set forth in writing and to explain the method by which commissions will be computed and paid. For purposes of this law, "commissions" are defined as compensation paid to any person in connection with the sale of the employer's property or services and based proportionately on the amount or value thereof. However, commissions do not include short-term productivity bonuses or bonus and profit-sharing plans unless such payments are based on the employer's promise to pay a fixed percentage of sales or profits as compensation for work.
The Lawletter Vol 37 No 11
The Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq., imposes certain obligations upon the holder/owner of a mortgage (the mortgagee) as well as upon the servicer of the mortgage loan. Recently, in Kievman v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, No. 1:12-cv-22315-UU, 2012 WL 5378036 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2012), the court considered whether a mortgagee could be liable for the servicer's TILA violation.
In that case, the plaintiff-mortgagors alleged a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2) and attempted to hold the mortgagee and the servicer liable for this violation. That statutory section, referring only to the servicer, provides:
Upon written request by the obligor, the servicer shall provide the obligor, to the best knowledge of the servicer, with the name, address, and telephone number of the owner of the obligation or the master servicer of the obligation.
15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2). Moreover, § 1640 imposes liability for noncompliance with § 1641(f)(2):
[A]ny creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this part, including . . . subsection (f) or (g) of section 1641 of this title . . . with respect to any person is liable to such person[.]
Id. § 1640(a). Confusingly, although § 1641(f)(2) refers only to a servicer, § 1640(a) refers only to a creditor (the mortgagee). The plaintiffs emphasized this fact to argue that a creditor-mortgagee should be held liable for its servicer's violation of § 1641(f)(2). Rejecting this argument, the court stated:
This Court . . . declines to extend liability to obligation owners—be they creditors or assignees—for their servicers' failures to comply with § 1641(f)(2). The reference to "subsection (f)" in § 1640(a) is best explained by the fact that the owner of an obligation may sometimes act as the servicer of that obligation. The statute contemplates this scenario in the first paragraph of subsection (f), which reads: "A servicer of a consumer obligation . . . shall not be treated as an assignee of such obligation for the purposes of this section unless the servicer is or was the owner of the obligation." 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(1). In the case of an owner‑servicer, then, failure to comply with subsection (f) does subject it to liability. See Khan, 849 F.Supp.2d at 1382 n. 2 ("The Court notes that an entity that is both the servicer and lender on a loan would clearly be liable for damages."); Davis v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-2719, 2011 WL 707221 at *3 (N.D.Ga. Mar. 1, 2011) (noting that subsection (f)(1) "limits a servicer's liability to situations in which the servicer was once an assignee or owner of the loan"). But there is no question of vicarious liability for the servicer's violation if the servicer could not itself be held liable. See Holcomb, 2011 WL 5080324, at *7 ("[I]t remains unclear what liability would transfer given that [the servicer] itself bears no liability under the facts alleged.").
Kievman, 2012 WL 5378036, at *3. As the court logically pointed out, a mortgagee that services its own loan could be liable for a violation of § 1641(f)(2). "[T]his Court's interpretation recognizes that § 1640(a)'s reference to subsection (f) creates a private right of action against those obligees who might employ unfair practices in servicing their loans[.]" Id. at *4 (court's emphasis).
Thus, a mortgagee may very well not be liable under TILA for its servicer's violation of the Act. However, it should be noted that there is likely a division of authority on this issue. In fact, the same district responsible for the Kievman decision had previously held that a creditor-mortgagee could be held vicariously liable for damages under TILA for a loan servicer's failure to properly respond to a borrower's request for information about the loan owner under § 1641(f)(2). Khan v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
Topics: legal research, Alistair Edwards, The Lawletter Vol 37 BNo 11, commercial law, mortgagee liability for servicer violation of TILA, Kievman v. Fed. Natl Mortg. Assn, SD Florida, mortgagee not liable if not servicer
The Lawletter Vol 37 No 9
As judgment creditors throughout the nation have experienced firsthand, it is often more difficult to enforce a judgment against a financially strapped debtor than it is to obtain the judgment in the first place. To further complicate matters, state and federal laws protect certain assets, such as retirement pensions, from garnishment. In an effort to circumvent such measures, creditors may attempt to garnish the debtor's bank account into which protected monies have been deposited. On a nationwide basis, these efforts have met with mixed success. Some courts have held that protected funds cannot be garnished even after they have been deposited in the debtor's account, whereas other courts have ruled that the monies lose their protected status once they have been deposited.
This split of authority was highlighted in the recent case of Anthis v. Copland, 270 P.3d 574 (Wash. 2012). There, Bonnie Anthis won a wrongful death lawsuit against Walter Copland, a retired police officer. To enforce the judgment, Anthis attempted to garnish Copland's only known asset, his retirement pension, which had been deposited in Copland's personal bank account. Copland, in turn, claimed that the funds were exempt from garnishment or attachment. The relevant Washington state statute states that a person's right to a retirement allowance "shall not be subject to execution, garnishment, attachment, . . . or any other process of law whatsoever." Wash. Rev. Code § 41.26.053(1).
In analyzing the merits of Copland's claim, the Washington Supreme Court conducted a detailed exploration of how other state and federal courts have dealt with benefits-exemption statutes. As a general rule, these courts have held that "some unambiguous reference to money actually paid to or in the possession of the pensioner is necessary in order to find that pension funds retain their exempt status postdistribution." Anthis, 270 P.3d at 578 (¶ 14). Federal courts, for example, have ruled that the language of the Social Security Act prohibiting garnishment of "the moneys paid or payable" to a beneficiary mandates the continued protection of such funds "even after deposit" in the beneficiary's personal bank account. Id. (citing Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 415-17 (1973)).
In contrast, the language of the ERISA statutes simply requires that employee benefits plans prohibit the assignment or alienation of benefits. The First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that this language is not an antialienation provision and, therefore, does not prohibit garnishment after funds are deposited into pensioners' personal bank accounts. Id. at 578-79 (¶ 15). The Fourth Circuit, however, has ruled that a pensioner cannot be required to turn over ERISA benefits that have been paid to him. Id.; see United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 684 (4th Cir. 1995).
Cases decided under state law "have tended to follow the federal holdings requiring explicit language to exempt benefit payments deposited into a personal bank account or otherwise placed into the personal possession of the debtor." Anthis, 270 P.3d at 579 (¶ 16). A Michigan court of appeals, for example, had held that its state exemption statute protected only a retiree's right to a benefit and, therefore, did not prohibit garnishment of monies paid as a retirement benefit. Id. (discussing Whitwood, Inc. v. S. Blvd. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 701 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)).
Topics: legal research, Charlene Hicks, The Lawletter Vol 37 No 9, benefits-exception statutes, Social Security Act prohibits garnishment after fu, creditor's rights, enforcement of judgment, protection of funds once deposited in bank, unambiguous statute language generally governs sta
October 30, 2012
In recent days, federal officials have launched an all-out effort to halt the fraud and corruption plaguing the nation's bank mortgage industry. On October 9, 2012, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") filed three separate federal court lawsuits against allegedly phony mortgage-relief companies. These suits accuse the companies of having engaged in deceptive business practices by falsely assuring struggling homeowners that they could save their homes from foreclosure, charging thousands of dollars in up-front fees, and then providing little or no actual assistance. On the same day, the U.S. Attorney General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") announced the results of the Distressed Homeowner Initiative, a year-long, coordinated, multilevel investigation targeting predatory foreclosure-rescue and mortgage-modification schemes. Meanwhile, on another front, the U.S. attorney's office in Manhattan filed a mortgage fraud lawsuit against Wells Fargo, accusing the major bank of having engaged in improper underwriting of home loans for over a decade. The following day, October 10, the FTC announced that it had reached a settlement with Equifax on allegations concerning the improper sale of information on late borrowers. The FTC alleged that Equifax had sold more than 17,000 lists of consumers who met specific criteria, such as being late on their mortgage payments, to Direct Lending Source, which, in turn, had sold the lists to various third parties.
A major source of ammunition in these federal efforts against mortgage fraud is the newest provision of the FTC's Mortgage Assistance Relief Services ("MARS") Rule, which was issued in November 2010. See 12 C.F.R. § 1015.5. This Rule prohibits mortgage-relief companies from collecting any fees until the homeowner has a written offer from his or her lender or servicer that the individual deems acceptable. Mortgage-relief services that charge advance fees to consumers may be held civilly or criminally liable for violation of the MARS Rule. See id. § 1015.10.
Notably, attorneys are generally exempt from MARS Rule prohibitions. Id. § 1015.7. To qualify for exemption from all MARS disclosure rules except the advance-fee ban, an attorney must satisfy three conditions: (1) The attorney must be engaged in the practice of law; (2) the attorney must be licensed in the state where the consumer or dwelling is located; and (3) the attorney must comply with state laws and regulations governing attorney conduct relating to the MARS Rule. Id. § 1015.7(a). To qualify for an exemption from the ban against advance fees, the attorney must also meet a fourth requirement: Any up-front fees collected must be placed in a client trust account, and the attorney must abide by state laws and regulations governing such accounts. Id. § 1015.7(b).
Broadly speaking, the sweeping actions just taken by various federal agencies may signal a general change in attitude from one that is "procreditor" to a more lenient "prodebtor" perspective. Such a shift in the law could potentially benefit debtors seeking relief from seemingly harsh creditor-imposed penalties of all types.
Topics: legal research, Charlene Hicks, business law, predatory mortgage-relief schemes, Mortgage Assistance Relief Services (MARS) Rule, attorneys generally exempt, noticeable increase in attorney fraud, government to enforce more stringent regulations a
The Lawletter Vol 37 No 7
Precision is essential in drafting effective legal contracts of any type. If the contract language is not sufficiently expansive to include a particular party or situation, contractual obligations that were intended to be binding may be set aside as inapplicable. At the same time, however, there has been a great movement toward "plain language" contracts as opposed to agreements comprised of "legalese." The interplay between these potentially conflicting themes was recently highlighted by the First Circuit's opinion in Gove v. Career Systems Development Corp., 689 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012), a case involving the applicability of an employer's mandatory arbitration clause to an unsuccessful job applicant.
In that case, Ann Gove applied for a job with Career Systems Development Corporation ("CSD"). The final section of the electronic job application contained the following arbitration clause:
CSD also believes that if there is any dispute between you and CSD with respect to any issue prior to your employment, which arises out of the employment process, that it should be resolved in accord with the Dispute Resolution Policy and Arbitration Agreement ("Arbitration Agreement") adopted by CSD for its employees. Therefore, your submission of this Employment Application constitutes your agreement that the procedure set forth in the Arbitration Agreement will also be used to resolve all pre-employment disputes.
Id. at 3. Gove duly checked the "accept" box next to the statement, indicating that she accepted the terms of the agreement, including the arbitration clause.
Gove was pregnant throughout the period in which her job application was processed. After she was not hired by CSD, Gove filed an employment discrimination lawsuit in federal district court against CSD. CSD moved to compel arbitration on the basis of the arbitration clause contained in the electronic job application. The district court denied CSD's motion on the grounds that the arbitration clause was ambiguous as to whether it applied to Gove, a job applicant who was never hired, and the ambiguity had to be construed against CSD as the drafter of the clause.
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed. In reaching this decision, the court began by emphasizing that the dispute concerned "the scope of the arbitration clause, not its validity." Id. at 5. In other words, the arbitration clause was clearly valid and effective in at least some circumstances.
In analyzing the scope of CSD's arbitration provision, the court noted that the arbitration clause was devoid of any reference to job "applicants." Id. at 6. "Instead, every reference is to 'your employment,' 'the employment process,' or 'pre-employment disputes.'" Id. Based on this language, the court determined that a reasonable basis existed for Gove's conclusion that she would be bound by the arbitration clause only in the event that she was ultimately hired.
Topics: legal research, Charlene Hicks, contracts, Gove v. Career Systems Development Corp., 1st Circuit, ambiguity of arbitration clause re scope, ambiguity construed against drafting party, The Lawletter Vol 37 No 7
The Lawletter Vol 37 No 5
Topics: legal research, Tim Snider, The Lawletter Vol 37 No 5, trademarks, enfringement, Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., 4th Circuit, duty to preserve issues, 15 USC § 1117, no treble damages or attorney's fees award, state law may provide additional remedies for cond
The Lawletter Vol 37 No 5