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    Civil Procedure

    CIVIL PROCEDURE/INTERLOCTURY APPEALS:  The Collateral Order Doctrine May Not Save an Immediate Appeal of a Denial of Summary Judgment Based on the Qualified Immunity Defense

    Posted by Trish Sifka on July 30, 2024 at 3:04 PM

    Trish Sifka—Senior Attorney

              It should be no surprise that a federal appellate court generally does not have jurisdiction to review immediate appeals of denials of motions for summary judgment. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting this exception to the rule that "interlocutory appeals are generally disallowed"). “But, under the collateral order doctrine, appellate jurisdiction extends to ‘a narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation,' but are sufficiently important and collateral to the merits that they should 'nonetheless be treated as final.'" United States ex rel. Citynet, LLC v. Gianato, 962 F.3d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Gianato”) (citing Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 347, 126 S. Ct. 952, 163 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2006) (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867, 114 S. Ct. 1992, 128 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1994))).  

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    Topics: civil procedure, collateral order doctrine

    The Utility of a Declaratory Judgment Action

    Posted by Paul A. Ferrer on October 26, 2023 at 1:52 PM

    Lawletter Vol  48 No. 3

    The Utility of a Declaratory Judgment Action

    Paul Ferrer—Senior Attorney

              Most states, as well as the federal government, have enacted some form of declaratory judgment act, which authorizes courts to declare the rights and other legal relations among parties even though traditional remedies for damages or equitable relief are not yet available. Virginia’s Declaratory Judgment Act is typical. It permits Virginia’s trial courts, “[i]n cases of actual controversy, . . . to make binding adjudications of right, whether or not consequential relief is, or at the time could be, claimed” by the parties. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-184. Declaratory relief is particularly useful in settling controversies involving the interpretation of written instruments, such as contracts, deeds, and wills, but relief may be sought whenever there is an “actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right.” Ames Ctr., L.C. v. Soho Arlington, LLC, 301 Va. 246, 876 S.E.2d 344, 347 (2022) (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-184). In Ames Center, the Virginia Supreme Court noted the struggle courts have sometimes faced in finding “the case-specific equilibrium where a declaratory-judgment action serves its intended purpose without going too far or not going far enough.” 876 S.E.2d at 348. That, however, was not one of those cases.

                In that case, the defendant leased hotel property under a long-term ground lease. The lease provided that if any construction was contemplated to be made on adjoining property, the tenant had to afford to the person undertaking the construction the right to enter the hotel property for the purpose of doing such work as the person “shall consider to be necessary to the safety and preservation of any of the foundations, walls or structures of the Building [being leased] from injury or damage and to support the same by proper foundations.” When a developer planning to build two 30-story buildings on adjacent property asserted a right to enter the hotel property pursuant to this provision, the tenant responded, in the strongest possible terms, that the developer was not welcome on the property, “for any reason.” In fact, the tenant threatened to have the developer’s representatives removed for trespassing and subjected to civil and criminal suit if they entered the property. The tenant went so far as to say that even a trespass in the form of a construction crane swinging into its airspace would be met with a damages action.

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    Topics: wills, wills & estates, declaratory relief, contract

    ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—LEGAL ETHICS “Reply All” Only When You Mean It

    Posted by Amy Gore on May 1, 2023 at 2:37 PM

         Amy Gore, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group, Inc.

        Like so many others in today’s society, lawyers are dependent upon electronic forms of communication, including email. The use of electronic communications has raised a plethora of ethical concerns for practitioners. Now, in addition to the previous ethical concerns, the dreaded “Reply All” is added to the list that practitioners must oversee.

         In Formal Opinion 503 (2023), the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility cautions lawyers to not copy their clients on electronic communications to opposing counsel, unless the intended result is a “reply all” response. The Committee cited Model Rule 4.2 which cautions that an attorney, in representing a client, may not “communicate” about the subject of the representation with a represented person absent the consent of that person’s lawyer, unless the law or court order authorizes the communication. When an attorney sends a communication to opposing counsel and includes the client on the email communication, the receiving attorney is likely going to reply all. This would result in opposing counsel communicating with a represented person, and possibly without the consent of the client’s attorney


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    Topics: e-mail, civil procedure, attorney-client, legal ethics

    Rule 60(b)(1) “Mistake” Includes a Judicial Error of Law

    Posted by Paul A. Ferrer on May 1, 2023 at 2:36 PM

    Paul Ferrer, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group, Inc.

            Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for various reasons, including “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have had a “longstanding disagreement whether ‘mistake’ in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law.” Kemp v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1856, 1861 & n.1, 213 L. Ed. 2d 90 (2022). Resolving that question in Kemp, the U.S. Supreme Court held, based on the text, structure, and history of Rule 60(b), that “a judge’s errors of law are indeed ‘mistake[s]’ under Rule 60(b)(1).” Id. at 1860. In so holding, the Supreme Court indicated that the term “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) should be given its broadest possible interpretation to include any mistake, including “all mistakes of law made by a judge.” Id. at 1862.

                The Supreme Court specifically rejected the Government’s narrower reading of Rule 60(b)(1) in Kemp that the term “mistake” includes “only so-called ‘obvious’ legal errors.” Id. The Supreme Court’s decision sensibly spared the federal district courts from having “to decide not only whether there was a ‘mistake’ but also whether that mistake was sufficiently ‘obvious,’” since the plain language of Rule 60(b)(1) “does not support—let alone require—that judges engage in this sort of complex line-drawing.” Id. at 1863. Thus, the rule going forward could not be any simpler: relief from a final judgment or order may be granted under Rule 60(b)(1) based on a judge’s “mistakes,” including legal errors.

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    Topics: civil procedure, Rule60(b)(1), error of law, mistake

    Fourth Circuit Reverses Course on Case-by-Case Approach to What Is a “Final Decision”

    Posted by Paul A. Ferrer on December 7, 2022 at 9:25 AM

    Paul Ferrer—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

                A question that has long vexed both litigants and courts alike is what constitutes a “final decision” triggering the right to file an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which confers jurisdiction on the federal circuit courts of appeals over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” In a civil case (except where the United States is a party), the notice of appeal from a “final decision” must be filed “within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Many an appeal has been lost just by failing to timely file the notice of appeal.

                Making a determination as to when an appeal must be filed to comply with the 30-day time limit is supposed to be relatively easy in light of the procedures specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Rule 58 requires that every judgment generally “must be set out in a separate document.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). If a separate document is required by Rule 58(a), then judgment is “entered,” and the time to appeal starts running, when the judgment is entered in the civil docket and the earlier of one of these two events occurs: (1) the judgment is, in fact, set out in a separate document, or (2) 150 days have run from the entry of the judgment in the civil docket. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2). The second alternative deals with those situations in which the district court, despite the requirements of Rule 58(a), does not set the judgment out in a separate document.

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    Topics: appeals, Paul A. Ferrer, civil procedure, final decision, 30-day limit

    ATTORNEY AND CLIENT: Ethical Considerations in a Virtual Practice

    Posted by Amy Gore on March 18, 2022 at 12:11 PM

    Amy Gore—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

                As the world’s efforts to combat COVID-19 continue, most practitioners have adapted their practice by virtual hearings and meetings. Virtual law practice was clearly contemplated before the pandemic, but health concerns and court closures have dragged many practitioners further into the future than may have been contemplated even five years earlier. These adaptations have permitted attorneys to keep their lights on their virtual practices while providing clients with continued access to legal representation. The ever increasing reliance on technology to deliver legal services, however, carries its own set of ethical concerns that must not be overlooked.

                The traditional ethical obligation of competence set forth in Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 includes the obligation to remain competent in changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology. The ethical obligation of communication, usually applied in apprising the client of any developments in representation, includes with it the ethical duty relating to disasters. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 482 (Sept. 19, 2018).

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    Topics: attorney-client, Amy Gore, virtual office, safeguarding electronic communications, ethical considerations, confidentiality

    Damages Awarded for Pursuit of Divorce Case in Violation of Automatic Stay

    Posted by April Wimberley on December 16, 2021 at 9:01 AM

    April Wimberley—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

                A bankruptcy court recently awarded attorney’s fees, compensation for emotional distress, and punitive damages to a debtor whose ex-husband continued litigating their divorce case in violation of the automatic stay. In re Payne, No. 20-30524 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2021). On January 15, 2020, the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County, Virginia, entered a final decree in the divorce case between Cynthia Payne and Thomas Payne. Thereafter, on January 31, 2020, Ms. Payne filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. In response to the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, the ex-husband, through his attorney, filed several documents in the divorce case, including a motion to stay and a motion to rehear and reconsider. The respondents maintained that the purpose of the motion to stay was to prevent the expiration of the state court’s jurisdiction due to the debtor’s bankruptcy and to address her alleged failure to disclose the existence of a bank account during the divorce litigation. The motion to rehear and reconsider aimed to have the state court reconsider issues of equitable distribution. The respondents did not seek stay of relief from the bankruptcy court before filing the state court motions.

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    Topics: bankruptcy, April Wimberley, violation of automatic stay, recovery of actual and punitive damages

    Successive Motions for Summary Judgment—When to Try for a “Second Bite at the Apple”

    Posted by Lee P. Dunham on November 18, 2021 at 10:06 AM

    Lee Dunham—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

         Your motion for summary judgment was denied. Not long thereafter, the judge in your case retires and is replaced by a new judge who seems much more sympathetic to your client’s arguments. The deadline to file a motion to reconsider has expired. Can you simply refile your motion and try your luck again with Judge #2? Sometimes, but caveats apply.

         Within a single action, consistency and efficiency are achieved by a doctrine known as the “law of the case.” See Watkins v. Elmore, 745 F. App’x 100, 102 (11th Cir. 2018); In re Justice Oaks II, Ltd., 898 F.2d 1544, 1549 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990). It is broadly similar to res judicata in that under the law-of-the-case doctrine, as a general rule, “an issue decided at one stage of a case is binding at later stages of the same case.” United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Hallahan v. Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 705 n.4 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (“The doctrine of law of the case establishes a presumption that a ruling made at one stage of a lawsuit will be adhered to throughout the lawsuit.”).

         Unlike res judicata, however, the law of the case is “not jurisdictional in nature, and the court's power is not limited thereby” but, rather, is “a rule of practice ‘self-imposed by the courts.’” United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 662, 668 (11th Cir. 2014). While res judicata is a rule of law, the law of the case merely “directs a court's discretion.” Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983), decision supplemented, 466 U.S. 144 (1984).

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    Topics: civil procedure, Lee Dunham, motions for summary judgment, law-of-the-case doctrine, no cause of undue prejudice

    Attorney's Fees as Damages for Breach of Covenant Not to Sue

    Posted by Paul A. Ferrer on August 20, 2021 at 9:10 AM

    Paul Ferrer—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

                The familiar "American rule" holds that a prevailing party generally cannot recover its attorney's fees from the losing party in the absence of a statute or contract provision specifically authorizing an award of such fees. Jurisdictions are divided on the issue of whether a party can recover its attorney's fees as damages, rather than costs, for the breach of a covenant not to sue the other party. In those jurisdictions that have not permitted attorney's fees to be awarded as damages, courts have reasoned that the contract containing the covenant not to sue can itself provide for attorney's fees in the event of its breach if that is the parties' intention. See Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 363 F.2d 1002, 1008 (2d Cir. 1966) ("Certainly it is not beyond the powers of a lawyer to draw a covenant not to sue in such terms as to make clear that any breach will entail liability for damages, including the most certain of all—defendant's litigation expense."). By contrast, other courts have determined that the American rule does not apply in "those cases in which the attorney fees are not awarded to the successful litigant in the case at hand, but rather are the subject of the law suit itself." Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 455 (9th Cir. 1987). Virginia recently adopted the latter view.

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    Topics: Paul A. Ferrer, civil procedure, attorneys fees, breach of covenant, damages vs. costs, covenant not to sue

    Responding Competently to Incompetently Drafted Pleadings

    Posted by Lee P. Dunham on May 6, 2021 at 12:21 PM

    Lee Dunham—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

                As most seasoned practitioners are all too aware, it is often more time- consuming and frustrating to litigate a case against an incompetent pro se party or opposing counsel than it is to oppose a good lawyer. A litigant who is sloppy, mentally unwell, or who has very little understanding of the law can simply invent fictions faster than a competent and ethical attorney can refute them. Luckily, such a litigant often reveals his or her incompetence immediately through his or her pleadings. The best way to limit wasted time is usually to attempt to dispose of as much of the case as possible “on the papers.” Dismissal is, of course, the ideal result, but even if dismissal is not possible, it is still better to force the opponent to proceed on “cleaned up” and comprehensible pleadings without irrelevant statements or unsupportable claims.

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    Topics: civil procedure, Lee Dunham, drafting pleadings, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, incompetence

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