The Lawletter Vol. 51 No. 3 

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT: Enough Is Enough: Florida Supreme Court Amends Rules to Combat AI Misuse

Jason Holder—Senior Attorney

     Much like their sister jurisdictions, Florida’s courts have seen an alarming increase in the citation of nonexistent caselaw stemming from the use of generative artificial intelligence by both attorneys and pro se litigants. See, e.g., Goya v. Hayashida, 418 So. 3d 652, 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (Party’s brief cites cases “for the proposition that a party claiming inherited property must provide documents of transfer or other formal proof of inheritance. These cases do not exist, and no cases stand for that proposition or various other contentions in her brief.”); Russell v. Mells, 426 So. 3d 913, 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025) (holding that attorney “fundamentally abdicated” duty to the court and client by submitting a filing without verifying that the three cases cited said what was claimed and referring the matter to the Florida Bar “to proceed as it deems appropriate”); Hessert v. Hessert, No. 6D2026-0121, 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 2188, at *1-2 (6th DCA Mar. 20, 2026) (“[T]he petition filed by Petitioner cites to thirteen cases. Only four of the cited cases both exist and are cited for legal propositions that the cited cases actually represent. Five of the cited cases do not exist. Four of the cited cases are cited for legal propositions that the cited cases do not actually represent.”); Young v. AP, No. 25-CA-352, 2025 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 2476, at *30-32 (Aug. 29, 2025) (hallucinated cases found in motion for leave to amend); Rodriguez v. Baylis, No. 2025-CA-004973-O, 2025 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 2738, at *3-4 (Sept. 10, 2025) (pro se plaintiff appeared to have included artificial intelligence research and an AI platform hallucinated case that did not exist, but concluding that party “made an honest and genuine mistake as a pro se or self-represented litigant without the resources of a licensed attorney lacking any malice or bad faith”). As explained by one judge, “[c]hatbots are going to get better, and that's going to make these problems worse. The question now must be how to address them on the front end.” Gouveia v. Meridian Fin. Invs., LLC, No. 4D2025-0843, 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 2306, at *8, 15 Fla. L. Weekly D 600 (4th DCA Mar. 25, 2026) (Lott, J., concurring).

The Lawletter Vol. 50 No. 4

 Jason Holder—Senior Attorney 

ATTORNEY ETHICS: How to Make a Bad Situation Worse: Court Sanctions Attorney for Using Hallucinated Cases to Defend Himself Against Motion Alleging Prior Use of Hallucinated Cases

       In a cautionary tale for attorneys seeking to use artificial intelligence (“AI”) technology in an effort to save time and money, a New York trial court has sanctioned counsel for relying “upon unvetted AI—in his telling, via inadequately supervised colleagues—to defend his use of unvetted AI.” Ader v. Ader, 2025 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7848, at *1, 2025 NY Slip Op 51563(U), 1, 87 Misc. 3d 1213(A), 240 N.Y.S.3d 701 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Oct. 1, 2025). The initial offense was brought to the court’s attention when the opposition “identified inaccurate citations and quotations in Defendants' opposition brief that appeared to be ‘hallucinated’ by an AI tool.” Id. at *3. Without admitting or denying the use of AI, the offending attorney initially suggested that the passages cited by the opposition “were intended as paraphrases or summarized statements of the legal principles established in the cited authorities.” Id. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that the “paraphrases” included “bracketed terms to indicate departure from a quotation (not something one would expect to see in an intended paraphrase) and comments such as ‘citation omitted.’” Id. at *4. Compounding matters, the cases cited relied upon for the alleged paraphrases of law “did not stand for the propositions quoted, were completely unrelated in subject matter, and in one instance did not exist at all.” Id.

The Lawletter Vol. 50 No. 1

Jason Holder—Senior Attorney

    In August 2023, Alice Minium filed a Virginia Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request seeking the name, job title, rank, unit or division, gender, race, as well as hiring and compensation information for each deputy employed by the Hanover County Sheriff's Office. Minium v. Hines, 83 Va. App. 643, 647, 911 S.E.2d 822 (2025). In response, Minium received a spreadsheet with the requested information for a fraction of the Office, with the list excluding the names of all deputies below the rank of Captain. Id. at 648. These exclusions, a note explained, were made pursuant to the provision making discretionary the disclosure of “[t]he identity of any victim, witness, or undercover officer, or investigative techniques or procedures.” Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3706 (B)(10).

     Unsatisfied with this response, Minium filed for a writ of mandamus and was met with a supplemental list containing “approximately 25 names including those from the original production but fail[ing] to provide the names of all deputies employed by the County, specifically those below the rank of Captain.” Minium, 83 Va. App. at 648. With this second list, Minium was informed “that the reason for withholding the names of the officers below the rank of Captain was due to staffing concerns for undercover operations based on Code § 2.2-3706(B)(8).” Id.; Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3706(B)(8) (preventing mandatory disclosure of “[t]hose portions of any records containing information related to undercover operations or protective details that would reveal the staffing, logistics, or tactical plans of such undercover operations or protective details”).

The Lawletter Vol. 48 No. 1

Jason Holder, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group, Inc.

          Accused of sexually assaulting a patient while working as a certified nursing assistant, Terence Tekoh was interrogated “at length” by a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy. Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 2099, 213 L. Ed. 2d 479, 485 (2022). While the Deputy ultimately secured a written statement from Tekoh apologizing for inappropriate touching of a patient, the Deputy had failed to inform Tekoh of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Vega, 142 S. Ct. at 2099-2100. Following a mistrial, Tekoh was acquitted at the conclusion of his second trial. Id. at 2100. In both criminal trials, judges refused to suppress the un-Mirandized statement. Id.

        Following his acquittal, Tekoh brought suit against the Deputy and other defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Id. An improper jury instruction led to a second trial in the civil action at which Tekoh requested the jury be instructed that it was “required to find that Vega violated the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination if it determined that he took a statement from Tekoh in violation of Miranda and that the statement was then improperly used against Tekoh at his criminal trial.” Id. The trial court refused the request, holding that Miranda establishes a mere prophylactic rule that could not, standing alone, provide a ground for § 1983 liability. Id. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “Dickerson [v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000)] made clear that the right of a criminal defendant against having an un-Mirandized statement introduced in the prosecution's case in chief is indeed a right secured by the Constitution.” Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles, 985 F.3d 713, 720 (9th Cir. 2021).

The Lawletter Vol 47 No 1

Jason Holder—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     Arthur Lange (“Lange”) drove past a highway patrol officer with his windows down, music blaring, and repeatedly honking on his horn; in short, Lange “was asking for attention.” Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2021). The officer followed Lange a short distance before turning on his overhead light and attempting to pull Lange over. Id. Lange was seconds away from his home, however, and chose to continue to his driveway and pull into his garage. Id. The officer continued his pursuit and confronted Lange with the subsequent investigation revealing, perhaps unsurprisingly, that Lange was under the influence of alcohol.See id. (blood test revealed Lange was more than three times the legal limit).

     Upon being charged with driving under the influence as well as a noise infraction, Lange moved to suppress all the evidence obtained by the officer’s warrantless entry into the garage. Id. In response, the prosecution argued that “the pursuit of a suspected misdemeanant always qualifies as an exigent circumstance authorizing a warrantless home entry.” Id. (emphasis added). The state courts accepted this argument and the U.S. Supreme Court granted review to resolve the conflict between the various state/federal courts regarding a categorical rule of exigency when in pursuit of a fleeing suspect. Id. at 2017.

The Lawletter Vol 45 No 6

Jason Holder—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     With the spread of COVID-19, most jurisdictions have declared a state of emergency and/or issued executive orders curtailing daily life. See, e.g., Cal. Exec. Order N-33-20 (Californians must "stay home or at their place of residence except as needed to maintain continuity of operations of the federal critical infrastructure sectors"); D.C. Mayor’s Order 2020-054 (District residents must "stay in their residences except to perform essential activities, engage in essential business, provide or obtain government services, or engage in certain authorized recreational activities not involving close contact with other persons"); N.Y. Exec. Order 202.8 (nonessential businesses and nonprofit entities must "reduce the in-person workforce at any work locations by 100%"); Va. Exec. Order 53 (nonessential "brick and mortar retail business[es] . . . may continue to operate but must limit all in-person shopping to no more than 10 patrons per establishment"). State and federal courts have also been forced to alter procedures, extend deadlines, or even limit court access. An updated list of orders, see https://web.csg.org/covid19/executive-orders/. Court closures and restrictions can be found at https://www.law360.com/articles/1252836.

The Lawletter Vol 45 No 1

Jason Holder—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

            On what the court in United States v. Bosyk, 933 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2019), described as a "secretive online message board," id. at 322, a link appeared with a message explaining that the link would lead to multiple videos of child pornography.  On the same day that this link appeared, an IP address associated with Bosyk's house accessed the link to view the advertised materials.  Id.  Armed with these facts, and a brief description regarding the characteristics of individuals who possess and access child pornography, investigators were able to obtain a search warrant for Bosyk's residence authorizing the seizure of "computers, digital devices, storage media, and related evidence."  Id. at 323.

The Lawletter Vol 44 No 2

Jason Holder—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

            Following an incident in which he allegedly grabbed, choked, and struck the mother of his children, Saylor Suazo (“Suazo”) was charged with a variety of crimes including assault in the third degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, endangering the welfare of a child, menacing, and harassment in the second degree.  People v. Suazo, No. 117, 2018 WL 6173962, at *1 (N.Y. Nov. 27, 2018).  Immediately before the start of trial, however, the prosecution moved to reduce the charges to attempt crimes.  Id.  This reduction meant that Suazo now faced a maximum sentence of three months in jail and, more importantly, that the offenses could be tried without a jury pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 340.40(2).  Id. 

            Suazo challenged the reduction and continued to assert his right to a jury trial, arguing that he was a noncitizen charged with deportable offenses rendering any conviction sufficiently serious to mandate a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.  Id.  In response, the prosecution argued that any deportation was merely a "collateral consequence" and not a criminal penalty for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.  Id. 

The Lawletter Vol 43 No 4

Jason Holder, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

            Early in the morning on March 16, 2008, the D.C. Police received a complaint of loud music coming from a house in Northeast D.C. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 583 (2018). When officers responded to the house, they found it in a state of disarray with beer bottles and cups of liquor all over. Id. The floor was so dirty, the officers noted, "that one of the partygoers refused to sit on it while being questioned." Id. Although it had working electricity and plumbing, the house contained no furniture aside from a few folding chairs. A further inspection of the house found the living room transformed into "a makeshift strip club," and "more debauchery upstairs." Id.

            While many of the 21 individuals found in the house claimed to be throwing a bachelor party, none could identify the supposed bachelor. Id. A woman identified only as "'Peaches' or 'Tasty,'" was allegedly renting the house, but when the officers attempted to contact her, "Peaches" refused to meet with police "because she was afraid of being arrested." Id. "Peaches" eventually admitted that she did not have permission to be in the house and a call to the owner confirmed this. Id. at 583-84. Based upon their investigation, the officers arrested all 21 individuals present for unlawful entry, id. at 584, although a lieutenant later decided to charge them with disorderly conduct. Id. All charges were ultimately dropped. Id.

The Lawletter Vol 42 No 8

Jason Holder, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

            Amanda Geraci ("Geraci") attempted to record a Philadelphia police officer's actions as he arrested an antifracking protester. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 356 (3d Cir. 2017). Despite the fact that she was not interfering with the officer, a second officer pinned Geraci against a pillar, preventing her from observing or recording the arrest. Id. Geraci faced neither arrest nor citation for her actions. Id.

            Richard Fields ("Fields") was walking down a public sidewalk when he noticed a number of police officers breaking up a house party across the street.  Id. As Fields took a photograph of the scene, an officer ordered him to leave the scene. Id. When Fields refused, the officer arrested him, confiscated his phone, and searched it opening "several videos and other photos."  Id.

            Geraci and Fields brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, inter alia, "that the officers illegally retaliated against them for exercising their First Amendment right to record public police activity."  Id.  In doing so, they noted a 2011 Philadelphia Police Department memorandum "advising officers not to interfere with a private citizen's recording of police activity because it was protected by the First Amendment," and department directive issued a year later reiterating the existence of the right.  Id.