Jim Witt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group
The virtual currency known as "Bitcoin," created by anonymous computer programmers, has been traded on online exchanges as an item of investment, subject to few fees and no government regulation. The price has fluctuated wildly, from a few cents to more than $1,000 per Bitcoin unit. Programmers are able to obtain new coins through a computer technique known as "mining."
With a growing number of merchants now accepting Bitcoin as payment and general pressure on governments to regulate virtual currency (especially in view of the collapse of the largest virtual currency exchange, Mt. Gox), the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has announced its position on the income tax treatment of Bitcoin. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938.
The IRS defined "virtual currency" as "a digital representation of value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or a store of value," id. sec. 2, and noted that Bitcoin fit this definition as a form of currency convertible into legal tender.
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Topics:
IRS will treat as property rather than currency,
Bitcoin,
virtual currency,
Bitcoin subject to capital gains tax
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 7
Alistair Edwards, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p, is a consumer protection statute that protects consumers from unfair, deceptive, and harassing collection practices, while leaving debt collectors free to employ efficient, reasonable, and ethical practices in pursuit of their profession. Among other things, the FDCPA requires a debt collector to give certain notices to the consumer. For example, § 1692g provides:
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Topics:
legal research,
Alistair Edwards,
creditor's rights,
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 7,
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
consumer protection statute,
initial § 1692g information may be oral
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 7
John Stone, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group
An architectural firm and two developers sued a City after the City abandoned its plan, under a "Memorandum of Understanding" ("MOU") into which the parties had entered, to develop a publicly funded hotel. The plaintiffs asserted claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit. The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted summary judgment for the City on both claims. Stevens & Wilkinson of S.C., Inc. v. City of Columbia, No. 27434, 2014 WL 4087936 (S.C. Aug. 20, 2014) (not yet released for publication).
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Topics:
legal research,
S.C. Supreme Court,
John M Stone,
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 7,
contracts law,
memorandum of understanding,
nonbinding,
Stevens & Wilkinson of S.C. v. City of Columbia,
only intention to enter future agreements,
document terms indicated nonbinding,
quantum meruit requires unjust enrichment
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 7
Brad Pettit, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group
A recent decision by the U.S. Tax Court illustrates the difficulties that can be encountered by taxpayers who want to avoid the special rules that apply with respect to the deductibility of losses from "passive" business or investment activities. In Schumann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-138, 2014 WL 3408198, the Tax Court ruled that since an individual who invested in rental real estate was not a "real estate professional," the deductibility of losses that he sustained in connection with his rental property activities and investments was subject to the passive activity loss rules that are set forth in § 469 of the Internal Revenue Code.
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Topics:
legal research,
Brad Pettit,
tax,
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 7,
deductibility of losses,
passive business or investment activities,
includes rental activity,
Schumann v. Commissioner,
26 U.S.C. § 469,
loss disallowed in taxable year it occurred,
documentation time involved to establish time spen
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 7
Anne Hemenway, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, developed by the U.S. Supreme Court, provides that because the jurisdiction of the federal district courts "is strictly original," Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923), a federal district court "has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings[,]" D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). The doctrine is consistent with, and serves to implement, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which allows only the U.S. Supreme Court to review final judgments and decrees rendered by the highest court of a state.
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Topics:
legal research,
Anne Hemenway,
civil procedure,
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 7,
federal court jurisdiction,
Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
28 U.S.C. § 1257,
Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschi,
Truong v. Bank of America defining terms "ine
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 6
Fred Shackelford, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group
When a jury awards different amounts of compensatory damages to multiple plaintiffs in the same case but also awards each plaintiff the same amount of punitive damages, can a court compare the compensatory damages awards to determine whether a punitive damages award is excessive? That was the issue before the Virginia Supreme Court in the case of Coalson v. Canchola, 287 Va. 242, 754 S.E.2d 525 (2014). There, an intoxicated motorist (Canchola) caused an accident that injured another driver (Coalson) and the other driver's passenger (Stemke). In an action by both injured parties against Canchola, the jury awarded compensatory damages of $5,600 to Coalson and $14,000 to Stemke, in addition to awarding $100,000 in punitive damages to each of them. The trial court remitted Coalson's punitive damages award, noting a "significant disparity" between the plaintiffs' compensatory damages awards but identical awards of punitive damages. On appeal, the Coalson court first determined that punitive damages were warranted based on Canchola's egregious conduct, as follows:
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Topics:
legal research,
Fred Shackelford,
Va. Supreme Court,
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 6,
personal injury law,
comparing punitive damages to prove excessive comp,
Coalson v. Canchola,
determination must be based on facts and circumsta
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 6
Matt McDavitt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group
It is well known that the jurisdiction conferred to the federal courts by the Judiciary Act of 1798 did not include authority over probate, as administration of decedent estates was reserved for the several states. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946). This jurisdictional exclusion of federal courts from probate matters has been deemed the "probate exception." While traditionally the probate exception was interpreted broadly, thereby deterring federal courts from assuming jurisdiction over matters even tangentially related to probate of estates, the scope of the probate exception has narrowed in recent years such that federal courts now will entertain suits involving probate estates under certain circumstances.
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically limited the scope of the probate exception, departing from prior jurisprudence and defining more precisely when federal courts may validly assume jurisdiction over disputes involving probate estates. The federal courts are not permitted to adjudicate issues involving (a) the administration of decedent estates, or (b) the disposition of property actually and presently in the in rem custody of the probate court, but issues outside these bounds are fair game for federal jurisdiction:
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Topics:
legal research,
Matt McDavitt,
estates,
U.S. Supreme court,
Third Circuit,
probate exception,
federal jurisdiction,
Marshall v. Marshall,
Three-Keys Ltd. V. SR. Utilities Holding Co.,
federal court may not probate,
annul,
dispose of property,
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 6
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 6
Doug Plank, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group
In what some commentators have described as the most important criminal law decision of its 2013-2014 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously in Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), that before police may search the contents of a cell phone seized after an arrest, they must first obtain a search warrant. In reaching this determination, which is a departure from the Court's general rule that a person's belongings may be searched without a warrant incident to an arrest of that person, the Court found that "[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person." Id. at 2489. In fact, the Court noted, many cell phones are actually minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone, and they could just as easily be called cameras, video players, Rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers. The Court found that because cell phones are both a repository of sensitive personal data, with immense storage capacity, and a portal to private records stored on remote servers, they simply could not fairly be said to be analogous to physical containers under the search-incident-to-arrest rule.
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Topics:
legal research,
cell phone,
warrantless search,
U.S. Supreme court,
Doug Plank,
criminal law,
not analogous to physical containers,
Riley v. California,
only case-specific exceptions applicable
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 5
Topics:
legal research,
Charlene Hicks,
contracts,
Washington Supreme Court,
Gandee,
The Lawletter Vol 39 No 5,
arbitration provision,
unconscionable,
US Supreme Court controversial cases require indiv,
Concepcion,
131 S. Ct. 1740,
Stolt Nielsen,
559 U.S. 662,
unconscionable claim analyzed under state law
