CRIMINAL LAW: Supreme Court Limits What Is Extraordinary and Compelling for Compassionate Release
Robert Westendorf—Senior Attorney
In two separate opinions recently handed down, the Supreme Court took a narrow view on what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling” reasons that justify early release. In Fernandez v. United States, No. 24-556, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2295, 146 S. Ct. 1292 (May 28, 2026), the defendant was convicted of murder for hire and sentenced to two life sentences. Id. at *8. Eventually, after his habeas challenge failed, the defendant filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582, which allows district courts to shorten prison sentences for extraordinary and compelling reasons. Id. at *7-11. He argued that he was actually innocent, which warranted a sentence reduction. Id. at *11. The district court agreed and granted the motion, but the Second Circuit reversed. Id. at *11-12. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in an opinion by Justice Barrett that was joined by the other conservative justices, affirmed. Id. at *12-26. The Court noted that collateral attacks on conviction are governed by the habeas statute of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which imposes “tight procedural constraints.” Id. at *13. The defendant’s motion under Section 3582 is “a collateral attack outside the rigorous habeas framework. . . . Challenging the validity of a conviction through a compassionate release motion circumvents the exacting requirements of §2255.” Id. at *15.
According to the Court, under the defendant’s reading, since Section 3582, in contrast to Section 2255, imposes no time limits, a prisoner could challenge his conviction repeatedly under Section 3582, even if any challenges under Section 2255 had failed. Id. at *16. This “system would enable prisoners not only to bypass § 2255, but also to override it.” Id. The Court determined it would not construe these statutes at cross purposes when it could construe them in harmony. Id. at *17. The extraordinary and compelling release standard is a demanding standard. Id. A reason is not compelling if Congress has “channeled it through the postconviction statutes.” Id. at *18. The Court also noted that Section 3582 is titled “Compassionate Release” and focuses on a defendant’s personal characteristics such as advanced age, safety risk, whether the defendant is ill, etc. Id. at *19-20. Ultimately, “the heartland extraordinary and compelling reasons that might warrant an early release from prison—age, illness, a child left with no guardian—bear no resemblance to the grounds for relief under § 2255.” Id. at *21-22 (cleaned up). In the end, the compassionate release provision is not the appropriate vehicle for a prisoner to make a claim that his conviction is invalid. Id. at *26. Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kagan, in which they voted to affirm the Second Circuit on the much narrower ground that a motion for compassionate release cannot justify a lower sentence if it relies on facts already considered by the court at the initial sentencing. Id. at *27. Justice Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion, and argued that the habeas statutes ultimately do not affect whether something can be extraordinary and compelling such that it justifies compassionate release. Id. at *30-31.
In Rutherford v. United States, Nos. 24-820 & 24-860, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2294, 146 S. Ct. 1320 (May 28, 2026), the defendants were convicted of various crimes, including using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. Id. at *8-9. After the First Step Act of 2018 was passed, the mandatory minimum that applies to defendants convicted of the same crimes of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence was decreased. Id. at *10. But this change is for the most part nonretroactive. Id. The Sentencing Commission had held that a nonretroactive amendment to a mandatory minimum can serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason that justifies release. Id. The defendants moved for compassionate release. Id. at *12. The Third Circuit ruled against the defendants, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in an opinion by Justice Barrett that was joined by the other conservative justices. Id. at *14-16. Amendments to criminal penalties that are nonretroactive are normal rather than extraordinary as nonretroactivity is the default. Id. at *16-17. For “compelling,” the Court found it hard to see how the decision not to extend reduced penalties for those already sentenced could be a compelling reason to warrant reduction. Id. at *17. Treating it as compelling would “undermine Congress’s choice to leave the sentence intact.” Id. Moreover, this would fall outside the normal compassionate release cases, which focus on a defendant’s personal characteristics. Id. While the Sentencing Commission may have held differently, their policy statements must be consistent with the statute, which they were not here. Id. at *25-26. Justice Sotomayor dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson and argued that “The Commission’s policy statement is consistent with Congress’s commands and centuries of legal practice in which courts look to the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether to modify a sentence.” Id. at *26-27.
