Lawletter Vol. 51, No. 4
Lee Dunham—Senior Attorney
In Chitlik v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, No. 2025-1804, __ F.4th __, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24000, 2026 WL 2288200 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided a case that may expand the universe of situations in which equitable tolling is an appealing argument for plaintiffs who missed a deadline. In Chitlik, the court addressed whether equitable tolling could excuse the late filing of a petition under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), a federal no-fault system established to compensate individuals who suffer certain vaccine-related injuries. In its decision, the court held that the special master and court of federal claims had applied an improperly demanding standard of diligence and failed to conduct the required case-specific inquiry.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16, the statute of limitations for a VICP claim is 36 months from the onset of the first symptom. As Chitlik alleged that he suffered a compensable vaccine-related injury on December 6, 2019, his statutory filing deadline was December 6, 2022. On November 26, 2022, ten days before the deadline, Chitlik mailed his petition to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims via certified first-class mail. While USPS's stated delivery commitment for first-class mail was five business days, Chitlik’s petition did not arrive until December 7, one day after the statutory deadline.
Chitlik sought equitable tolling, arguing that the unexplained USPS delay prevented timely filing despite his efforts. Chitlik cited the Supreme Court’s formulation that a party seeking to invoke equitable tolling has the burden to prove both “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).
However, the special master rejected equitable tolling on both grounds. She concluded that Chitlik had not exercised reasonable diligence because he could have used overnight or Priority Mail Express service, and that ordinary mail delays did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed based on the lack-of-diligence finding without reaching the “extraordinary circumstance” issue.
However, the Federal Circuit held on appeal that Chitlik had exercised reasonable diligence as a matter of law. The court emphasized that “maximum feasible diligence” is not the standard, and concluded that the special master had effectively imposed a categorical rule that a petitioner using non-guaranteed mail cannot demonstrate reasonable diligence. The court further held that the special master’s approach had been inconsistent with precedent requiring equitable tolling decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis rather than through rigid rules. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 653, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010); James v. Wilkie, 917 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Instead, the appropriate inquiry should consider all relevant circumstances, including the date the petition was mailed, the anticipated delivery time, the distance the petition had to travel, the available filing methods, and the amount of time remaining before the deadline.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the Court of Federal Claims' reasoning that Chitlik should have monitored his tracking information and, upon seeing a potential delay, sent a second petition by overnight delivery. The appellate court found that this expectation demanded more than reasonable diligence. Given the short distance involved (Chitlik’s petition only needed to travel from Cambridge, Maryland to Washington, D.C.) and the absence of meaningful pre-deadline evidence that the petition would arrive late, a reasonably diligent person could have expected the original mailing to arrive on time.
The Federal Circuit next considered the second equitable-tolling requirement: whether an extraordinary circumstance beyond Chitlik's control had caused the late filing. While it did not definitively decide the issue, it held instead that the special master had once again used an impermissible categorical rule by concluding that “a delay in regular mail is not an extraordinary circumstance.” Under Holland, supra, and Federal Circuit precedent, the “extraordinary circumstance” question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Chitlik that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the USPS delay could constitute an extraordinary circumstance. The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the Court of Federal Claims’ determination that Chitlik lacked reasonable diligence, vacated the special master's categorical determination that no extraordinary circumstance existed, and remanded for application of the case-specific standard to the “extraordinary circumstances” prong.
With its core holding that “reasonable diligence” does not necessarily require a claimant to select the fastest, most expensive, or most conservative filing method, Chitlik may have broad applicability outside of the vaccine injury context. For vaccine-injury petitioners, the decision is particularly important because it confirms that mailing the petition a reasonable time prior to the deadline can potentially demonstrate reasonable diligence, even when the court receives the petition after the statutory deadline.
