Lawletter Vol. 51, No. 4
Cassidy Crockett-Verba—Senior Attorney
Geofence warrants, which allow law enforcement to acquire an individual’s cell phone location data from Google, have been subject to repeated challenges under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unlawful search and seizure. The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed the issue, holding in Chatrie v. United States, 609 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 2193 (2026), that geofence warrants are considered searches under the Fourth Amendment, and that law enforcement must obtain a warrant before using them. In May 2019, the Call Federal Credit Union in Midlothian, Virginia, was robbed by an armed suspect, who took $195,000 from the bank’s vault. The suspect fled and law enforcement applied for a geofence warrant that drew a 150-meter fence around the credit union. The warrant requested location data from Google regarding all users within that 150-meter fence for the hour-long period surrounding the robbery. The location data came from individuals who used Google’s “location history,” which produced 209 location points from a little under 20 accounts present in the area. This was further narrowed to three accounts, including Chatrie’s, which ultimately led to his indictment, conviction, and sentencing.
When the Fourth Circuit found that the geofence warrant used to convict Chatrie was not a search under the Fourth Amendment, it created a split with the neighboring Fifth Circuit, which had found in United States v. Smith, 110 F.4th 817 (5th Cir. 2024), that geofence warrants were entirely unconstitutional. The Smith case followed the precedent set by the Supreme Court in 2018 with Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), holding that a warrant is necessary to collect location data regarding cell phones.
In Chatrie, the Supreme Court weighed in on the issue for the first time since Carpenter, and found that geofence warrants, like the one used to find Chatrie, are considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. While it stopped short of deciding whether the specific search at issue violated the Fourth Amendment, it found that individuals have a right to privacy in their location data.
The concern over geofence warrants is hardly new, and it is hardly the first time the courts have had to contend with new technology and privacy concerns. For example, Justice Brandeis opined that wiretapping should be considered a search in the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). In Olmstead, Justice Brandeis stated that the drafters of the Constitution “conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” These concerns were echoed nearly 100 years later in Carpenter, 585 U.S. 296, 138 S. Ct. 2206, in which the Court considered cell phone GPS data. In Carpenter, the Court found that because cell phones are carried on a daily basis, their data will provide a relatively complete picture of a person’s whereabouts and daily routine, and that prying into that information without a warrant is a violation of the expectation of privacy.
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Chatrie merely affirms its prior holding in Carpenter. Law enforcement is not prohibited from using the location data produced by cell phones, but it must obtain a warrant to do so. This decision provides another layer of protection for everyone—your digital location data is private and protected against unreasonable search by the U.S. Government.
