The Lawletter No. 50 Vol. 3
Robert Westendorf—Research Attorney
Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, was hired as an executive secretary by the Ohio Department of Youth Services in 2004 and was later promoted to program administrator. Ames v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 306, 145 S. Ct. 1540 (2025). In 2019, she applied for a newly created management position. Id. Although she was interviewed for the position, a lesbian woman was ultimately hired. Id. A few days after her interview, she was demoted from her program administrator position to her old secretary position. Id. The agency then hired a gay man for the now-vacant program administrator position. Id.
Ms. Ames sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging discrimination based on her sexual orientation. Id. The District Court granted summary judgment to the agency, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 306-07. Both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit held that Ms. Ames had not met her prima facie burden under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), which, in evaluating disparate treatment claims that rest on circumstantial evidence, requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive. Ames, 605 U.S. at 306-07. The Sixth Circuit held that Ms. Ames failed to meet her prima facie burden because she had not shown “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Id. at 307 (quoting Ames v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 87 F.4th 822, 825 (6th Cir. 2023)). According to the Sixth Circuit, Ms. Ames had to make this showing in addition to the usual showing for making a prima facie case. Id. Since Ms. Ames did not satisfy this burden by showing that the member of the relevant minority group made the decision at issue, or with statistical evidence showing that members of the majority group had been discriminated against, summary judgment in the agency’s favor was proper. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over whether majority-group plaintiffs have to satisfy a higher evidentiary burden to meet their prima facie case and reversed the Sixth Circuit in a unanimous opinion by Justice Jackson. Id. at 308-13. Justice Jackson noted that Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. Id. at 309. The text of Title VII makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual.” Id. By establishing “the same protections for every ‘individual’—without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group—Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.” Id. at 310. The Court looked to prior decisions to confirm that “[o]ur case law thus makes clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group.” Id.
According to the Court, the “background circumstances” rule leads to inflexible applications of the prima facie burden prong of McDonnell Douglas, which the Supreme Court had repeatedly rejected. Id. at 310-11. The Court noted that the Sixth Circuit’s opinion imposed a higher burden on Ms. Ames because of her sexual orientation. Id. The Court concluded that Title VII plaintiffs do not have to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard just because they are majority plaintiffs, and remanded to the lower courts. Id. at 312-13.
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion that Justice Gorsuch joined. Id. at 313-26. Justice Thomas argued that the “background circumstances” rule was a product “of improper judicial lawmaking.” Id. at 314. It is also hard to know who is a majority-group plaintiff in many situations, as women make up a majority of the whole population in the country, but not in some states or counties. Id. at 315. There would also be a problem in determining who is the majority-group plaintiff in the context of race and religion. Id. at 316-17. Justice Thomas ended his concurrence by arguing that the McDonnell Douglas framework should be reconsidered in an appropriate case. Id. at 319-26.
