Matthew T. McDavitt—Senior Attorney

Lawletter Vol. 49 No. 4

ESTATES:  Enactments of the Uniform Electronic Wills Act

Matt McDavitt—Senior Attorney

         Traditionally, to be valid, a last will and testament had to be executed on paper with the requisite will execution formalities, with the testator and the dual attesting will witnesses physically signing the instrument together at the will execution ceremony. In recent years, however, an increasing proportion of contracts and instruments nationally are executed wholly electronically, wherein the requisite signatures and witness attestations are now often made via digital means. Similarly, in states exacting the Uniform Electronic Wills Act, the testator, attesting witnesses, and notary may now appear via video conference in the “electronic presence” of each other, rather than in person. The Uniform Electronic Wills Act thus empowers testators in jurisdictions that have enacted this model statutory text to execute wills electronically, with the attesting witnesses able to appear and witness the will execution via video conference. Additionally, a valid electronic will under the Act must be a “tamper-evident electronic record” to guard against fraudulent tampering with such digital testamentary instrument post execution. Also, under the model Act, an electronic will, once validly executed, may be revoked via (1) a subsequent inconsistent will, or (2) by “physical act,” which, though not defined, may mean deletion of the authenticated, executed digital will file.

Matt McDavitt, Senior Attorney

            A common issue to be resolved in any administration of a decedent estate is the determination of the rightful value of the compensation due to the serving personal representative. While the will of the decedent may validly dictate the amount of compensation due to the serving personal representative (though, subject to judicial scrutiny), more commonly, the value of such fiduciary compensation follows statutory strictures. Lacking an appropriate testamentary personal representative compensation provision, states employ an array of calculation methods to determine the proper value of such remuneration based on one of several methods.

            A common methodology employed in personal representative compensation statutes is to examine a suite of elements characterizing the relative complexity of the estate administration, the objectively reasonable effort required to perform the necessary tasks, the diligence of the personal representative, and results attained therefrom:

Matthew McDavitt—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

      It is not uncommon for the estates of individuals at death to possess one or more souvenirs, pieces of jewelry, trophies, collectibles, or artworks made from animal parts, such as carved ivory, fur rugs, tortoise-shell ornaments, crocodile skin leather, and the like. What legal issues might an estate or beneficiary face if he were bequeathed animal parts listed in Endangered Species Act?

      The U.S. Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act (“ESA” or the “Act”) (currently codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544) on December 28, 1973, with the aim of barring commerce in the endangered and threatened species listed in the Act, as such financial value contributes to the continuing depletion of such species and the contraction of their populations and range.

      Importantly, among the acts prohibited under the ESA, it is forbidden for an individual to “possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship, by any means whatsoever, any such species taken in violation [of the Act].” Id. § 1538(a)(1)(D) (emphasis added). However, this statutory language barring possession of an ESA-regulated species part applies solely to animals “taken in violation” of the Act, i.e., the animal was captured and/or killed and transformed into a commercial product after such species had been listed to the ESA.

Matthew McDavitt—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     In some wills, testators expressly condition the beneficiaries’ receipt of legacies upon their survival to the date of actual distribution of the gift during the estate administration. In such circumstances, the question occasionally arises regarding the propriety of such survival mandate where (1) the administration is delayed beyond the average length due to dilatory conduct by the executor or due to litigation, and (2) one or more legatees survived the testator’s death but died prior to the distribution of the legacy. A handful of courts nationally have addressed this fact pattern, arriving at a logical rule applicable when unusual delay in distribution results in the one or more legatees predeceasing distribution.

     It is well-settled that the “personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent . . . as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate.” 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors and Administrators § 686 (2021). As such, a handful of American courts examining the issue have concluded that the equitable rule in this circumstance is that legacies conditioned upon beneficiary survival to the date of distribution vest at the time such legacies could first have been distributed (often a year from when the estate was opened), to protect such gifts when the administration is unduly delayed.

Matt McDavitt—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

            It is well-settled that in most states, completed inter vivos gifts are deemed irrevocable, even in circumstances where the donor’s relationship with the donee later deteriorates or the purpose of the gift dissipates. “Many gifts are made for reasons that sour with the passage of time. Unfortunately, gift law does not allow a donor to recover/revoke an inter vivos gift simply because his or her reasons for giving it have soured.” Dayal v. Lakshmipathy, 2020-Ohio-5441, ¶ 37, 163 N.E.3d 683 (quotation formatting and citations omitted). However, Louisiana has a unique statute that allows completed lifetime gifts to be revoked upon proper facts showing “ingratitude” to the donor, either through attempted murder or through cruel treatment, where an action is brought within a year of the injurious act or imputed knowledge of such.

Revocation on account of ingratitude may take place only in the following cases:

• If the donee has attempted to take the life of the donor; or
• If he has been guilty towards him of cruel treatment, crimes, or grievous injuries.

Matt McDavitt—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

            When a person dies without a will, the decedent’s estate is passed via the statutory regime of intestate succession, representing the presumed intention of most people to gift their estate at death to their close heirs.

            A decedent’s intestate heirs encompass one’s closest blood relatives (plus more remote relatives via representation through deceased family members who have died leaving surviving issue), plus any children that were legally adopted by the decedent, or their issue. However, while it is common nowadays for out-of-wedlock children to petition estate administrations in order to prove their relation to a claimed deceased father, the related circumstance also arises where the paternity of a presumptive child of marriage is challenged.In such a situation, may the parties interested in the estate contest the legitimacy of presumptively marital children where there is evidence that such a child was not, in fact, a blood relative of the decedent, as in the case of marital infidelity?

The Lawletter Vol 44 No 4

Matthew McDavitt—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

            The phrase "personal effects" is a descriptor that commonly leads to litigation regarding its usual or intended scope. Unqualified, the word "effects" in a testamentary context generally denotes personal property of any description. Adler v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 4 N.C. App. 600, 603, 167 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1969). However, pairing the adjective "personal" with the noun "effects" expressly modifies and limits its scope:

The adjective "personal" would be unnecessary and useless if it did not restrict the meaning of "effects," which standing alone would have covered all personalty. . . . [T]he words "personal effects" . . . [usually] cover only those articles of tangible personal property that in their use or intended use had some intimate connection with the person of the testatrix.

Gaston v. Gaston, 320 Mass. 627, 628, 70 N.E.2d 527, 528 (1947).  Thus, "[t]he term 'personal effects' ordinarily does not include cash and property held for investment." Beasley v. Wells, 55 So. 3d 1179, 1185 (Ala. 2010); In re Estate of Stengel, 557 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (the term "personal effects" meant tangible property worn or carried about the person or tangible property having some intimate relation to the person of the testatrix; the term did not include the bonds, stocks, savings and loan accounts, cash, coins, or currency).

Matthew McDavitt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

            In the execution of wills, many testators utilize the optional execution of self-proving affidavits, where statutorily authorized, wherein the will execution witnesses sign a statement before an officer authorized to administer oaths affirming their observation of the testator's mental capacity and testamentary intent, as well as the signing of the will. A properly executed self-proving affidavit raises a legal presumption of due execution and eliminates the normal requirement mandating that witnesses to a will testify in court as to the authenticity of the will.

            In practice, self-proving affidavits are normally created contemporaneously with the execution of the will, and some states' statutes mandate such simultaneous affidavit execution. However, some state statutes expressly allow self-proving affidavits to be executed at any time after the observed will execution. Thus, for example, we see both simultaneous and postexecution self-proving affidavit execution mentioned in Michigan's statutory provision on the subject:

The Lawletter Vol 42 No 2

Matt McDavitt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     Where testators or settlors create charitable gifts in trust for named institutional beneficiaries, when the contemplated distribution is ready to be made, sometimes it is found that the intended charity is involved in bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, the question arises as to the proper disposition of such charitable gifts in trust to the bankrupt institutional beneficiaries.

     There is little law, even nationally, discussing the proper course of action in the event that a named charitable beneficiary is found to be in bankruptcy at the time of distribution. It is logical that a testator who makes a charitable gift would not want his or her gift to be subject to collection by the intended recipient institution's bankruptcy trustee, as such action would solely benefit the charity's creditors, rather than advancing the intended charitable purpose. There is at least one federal opinion interpreting and predicting state law on this point, holding that: (a) Under Massachusetts law as predicted by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, a charitable organization that has ceased to perform charitable work, and that is incapable of redirecting funds for charitable purposes, is ineligible to receive a charitable bequest or gift, absent a contrary provision in will or trust instrument; and (b) It is "difficult to imagine" that, absent special circumstances, a testator seeking to advance general charitable interests would ever intend her gift to be used for the benefit of creditors rather than to promote charitable purposes actually intended. In re Boston Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 410 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 2005).