Charlene Hicks—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

            Prior to bringing a shareholder derivative action, the complaining shareholders must normally make a detailed presuit demand on the corporation’s board of directors or show the court that such a demand would be futile. In United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Zuckerberg, No. 404, 2020, 2021 WL 4344361 (Del. Sept. 23, 2021), the Delaware Supreme Court announced a new “universal test” for determining whether a shareholder demand should be excused as futile. This new test imposes more stringent pleading requirements on the derivative plaintiffs to show futility.

            In United Food, the complaining shareholders alleged that the members of Facebook, Inc.’s (now “Meta Platforms Inc.”) board of directors violated their fiduciary duties when they voted in favor of a stock reclassification that would have allowed Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s CEO, to sell most of his Facebook stock while still maintaining voting control. The Board’s vote eventually led to the company spending approximately $90 million to defend against a class action lawsuit. The complaining shareholders filed the derivative action in an attempt to recoup those litigation expenses.

Charlene Hicks—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group 

            To date, no consensus has been reached among courts throughout the United States on the question as to whether a creditor’s issuance of an IRS Form1099-C results in the extinguishment of the reported debt in favor of the debtor. Form 1099-C bears the title “Cancellation of Debt,” and, according to the IRS, a creditor should issue this form to the debtor for any year in which a debt is cancelled. Depending on the state in which the debtor resides, a creditor’s issuance of a Form 1099-C may have the effect of barring further collection efforts and of completely discharging the reported debt.

Charlene Hicks—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     Although the law generally does not allow a contracting party to bring a tort claim against another party to the same contract, this protection does not extend to persons or entities that are classified as "strangers" to the contract. Thus, a contracting party may maintain a viable claim for tortious interference with contractual relations against a stranger to the agreement. In practice, however, the performance of a contract is often contingent on the acts and approval of persons or entities that did not formally enter into the agreement. This makes it difficult to distinguish between a protected contracting "party" and an unprotected "stranger."

Charlene Hicks, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

            In what has been termed a groundbreaking opinion, the Second Circuit recently held that the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b), bars a consumer-buyer from revoking his or her contractual consent to receive creditor calls concerning the underlying contract or account.  The case, Reyes v. Lincoln Automotive Financial Services, 861 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2017), provides creditors with a strong defense against consumers who issue complaints about the creditors’ debt collection processes.

            In the case, Alberto Reyes Jr. (“Reyes”) leased a new Lincoln MKZ luxury sedan from a Ford dealership. The lease was financed by Lincoln. One provision of the lease stated that Reyes expressly consented to electronic or verbal contact from Ford and Lincoln and their agents, affiliates, and representatives. Id. at 53-54. This contact included manual calling methods, prerecorded voice messages, texts, and emails to any email or telephone number that Reyes provided, “now or in the future, including a number for a cellular phone or wireless device[.]” Id. at 54. In his lease application, Reyes provided Lincoln with his cell phone number.

Charlene Hicks, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     In Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016), the United States Supreme Court recently declared that the Department of Veterans Affairs (the "VA") is required to give priority to veteran-owned businesses in the bidding process for government contracts as long as two or more veteran-owned small businesses may reasonably be expected to submit fair and reasonable bids. This unanimous decision should provide a boon to veteran-owned businesses and should also give government agencies pause in assessing bids for contract work.

     The Kingdomware dispute originated shortly after the enactment of the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006 (the "VA Act"). The VA Act provides that the VA must restrict bid competitions to veteran-owned companies as long as the "rule of two" is satisfied. Specifically, 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d) states:

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 9

Charlene Hicks, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     For a prevailing party in a civil lawsuit to obtain attorney's fees, he or she must file a motion requesting fees by a statutory deadline. Problematically, however, many state statutes do not specify whether this deadline is tolled by the filing of a postjudgment motion. As a result, counsel may be placed in the awkward position of deciding whether to move for attorney's fees while the losing party's postjudgment motion is pending before the court.

      The effect of a postjudgment motion on the time in which a prevailing party must move for attorney's fees was recently addressed in Barbara Ann Hollier Trust v. Shack, Nos. 63308, 64047, 2015 WL 4656697 (Nev. Aug. 6, 2015). There, the court noted that Rule 54(d) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure requires a prevailing party to move for attorney's fees within 20 days after service of notice of entry of judgment. However, in the case before the court, the losing party filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial before the prevailing party moved for attorney's fees. The prevailing party did not file any motion for attorney's fees until after the court denied the losing party's postjudgment motions.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 5

Charlene Hicks, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

      In a matter of first impression, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term, recently ruled that a state law prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). In Schiffer v. Slomin’s, Inc., No. 2013-1867NC, 2015 WL 1566198 (N.Y. App. Term Mar. 30, 2015), consumers filed a lawsuit against a security systems provider that sold and installed home security systems. The complaint contained causes of action against the security systems provider for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud. In response, the security systems provider filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an unsigned contract provided to the buyers that contained a mandatory arbitration clause.

     A New York state law, General Business Law section 399-c, generally prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. The Schiffer plaintiffs were homeowners-consumers; therefore, the arbitration clause the security systems provider sought to enforce was void under New York state law.