The Lawletter Vol 41 No 4

Jim Witt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     The most straightforward tactic taken by large American corporations since the 1980s to avoid the full brunt of U.S. federal corporate income tax is known as "tax inversion" (or "corporate inversion"). This strategy has drawn considerable attention lately, with President Obama last summer calling on Congress to pass tax legislation to end the practice. In November 2015, the U.S. drug giant Pfizer announced its merger with Irish-headquartered Allergan, which, in the largest tax inversion to date, would give the merged company a situs in Ireland.

     Inversion transactions usually involve the transfer of stock of a corporation by one or more shareholders to a wholly owned or controlled foreign subsidiary of that corporation in exchange for newly issued shares of the subsidiary's stock. Internal Revenue Code § 7874 (rules relating to expatriated entities and their foreign parents) contains the tax rules related to inversions.

     Apple Inc., based in Cupertino, California, has gone well beyond the standard tax inversion maneuver. According to a study by Citizens for Tax Justice and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group Education Fund, Apple holds $181 billion in profit offshore that has escaped U.S. income tax. A May 20, 2013 report issued by the Senate Homeland Security Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations concluded that Apple's tax arrangements have nothing to do with the U.S. location of all the intellectual property that supports Apple's products. Non-U.S. sales account for 60% of Apple's profits, and these profits are routed through Irish subsidiaries that Apple established four years after its founding and are not taxed by any jurisdiction. The following discussion broadly outlines the rules that Apple, through its web of subsidiaries, takes advantage of to minimize its corporate income tax liability, eliminating U.S. corporate tax liability as long as foreign earnings are not repatriated.

The Lawletter Vol 41, No 3

Brad Pettit, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     The Restatement of Trusts provides generally that "[a] trustee may be removed . . . for cause by a proper court." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37(b) (2003 & Westlaw database updated Oct. 2015) (emphasis added). The Comment to section 37 of the Restatement says that "[f]riction between the trustee and some of the beneficiaries [of a trust] is not a sufficient ground for removing the trustee unless it interferes with the proper administration of the trust." Id. § 37 cmt. e(1). Thus, although the "[b]eneficiaries may be resentful when property they expected to inherit is placed in trust, or of reasonable exercise of a trustee's discretion with regard to matters of administration or the alleged underperformance of the trustee's investment program[, s]uch resentment ordinarily does not warrant removal of the trustee." Id. "[B]ut a serious breakdown in communications between beneficiaries and a trustee may justify removal, particularly if the trustee is responsible for the breakdown or it appears to be incurable." Id.

     A leading treatise on trust law notes that "[d]isagreeable personal relations between the beneficiary [of a trust] and the trustee are frequently relied upon as grounds for removal [and] the mere fact that the beneficiary wants the trustee removed is not enough" to sustain a petition for removal of a trustee. George Gleason Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 527 (Westlaw database updated Sept. 2015) (footnotes omitted). Thus, "[d]ifferences of opinion or unfriendliness" between a trust beneficiary and the trustee are "insufficient" grounds to support the removal of a trustee from office. Id. (footnotes omitted).

The Lawletter Vol 41, No 3

Matthew McDavitt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     Most states now allow nonresident corporations, such as trust companies, to serve in fiduciary roles such as the personal representative of a decedent estate, trustee, or trust or as the conservator of a guardianship estate. However, various state statutes place varying requirements on such fiduciary roles, such as whether state certification is required by such out-of-state corporate fiduciaries, which fiduciary roles are available to trust companies, and whether an in-state agent must be designated for service.

     One frequent requirement placed upon nonresident companies seeking to serve in a fiduciary role is that of reciprocity: The out-of-state corporation is allowed only the powers and authority granted to nonresident fiduciaries in its state of incorporation. Thus, where a trust company seeks to serve in a fiduciary role in another state, it is imperative to know whether both the state of incorporation and the foreign jurisdiction are "reciprocity" states. The following is a chart compiling the citations of the statutory nonresident corporate fiduciary reciprocity provisions currently in force in the 25 states that possess them: 

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 12

Jim Witt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     Given the steep rise in college tuition costs over recent years, the Qualified Tuition Plans ("QTPs") authorized by § 529 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 have become increasingly popular. The following summary describes the basic rules governing QTPs, but, as becomes obvious, the restrictions on these plans are formidable, and the rules can vary from state to state.

     There are two basic types of QTPs, a "prepaid qualified tuition program" and a "qualified tuition program savings plan" (informally known as a "college savings plan"). Under a prepaid qualified tuition program, a person may purchase tuition credits or certificates on behalf of a designated beneficiary (the student) that cover future tuition charges and fees, and, in some cases, a room and board option may be purchased. There is generally a premium charged over the current price of tuition, intended to account for inflation. The benefit of this type of QTP is that it locks in tuition costs to the extent of the credits purchased. Many state-sponsored prepaid tuition programs are guaranteed by the state (this is not true for college savings plans). Most state-sponsored plans require either the owner or the beneficiary of the plan to be a resident of the state (college savings plans have no residency requirement). Prepaid tuition plans have a limited enrollment period (there is no limited enrollment period for college savings plans).

     A college savings plan generally allows an individual (the "accountholder") to establish an account for the student/beneficiary to be used for the payment of eligible college expenses, which include tuition, room and board, mandatory fees, and books and computers (where required). College savings plans are not guaranteed, meaning that investment options are subject to market risk and the loss of any benefit should tuition growth outpace investment results. A college savings plan is more expansive in its coverage, providing for the payment of tuition, room and board, fees and books, and a computer (payment for a computer is in doubt as a qualified 529 expense, with proposed federal legislation covering the question).

     The funds invested in both prepaid tuition plans and college savings plans will grow without being subjected to federal income tax, and funds withdrawn from the account will not be taxable as long as they are used for qualified educational expenses. A majority of states provide for a state income tax deduction or credit for an investment in a college savings plan offered by the particular state. Funds withdrawn from a 529 plan that are not used for eligible expenses are subject to federal income tax and to a 10% penalty on earnings. College savings plans charge a fee covering operating costs. One study found that an average annual fee charged by a savings plan obtained through a state was 0.69%, whereas the average annual fee for a savings plan obtained through a broker was 1.17%.

     Obviously a theme of the 529 plans is the assorted restrictions and rules imposed by these plans. More basic is the question of whether these plans are a wise investment for the long term, given rising costs. According to Time magazine (October 5, 2015), a nonpartisan think tank, Education Policy Center, has found that while an annual investment of $1,000 in a 529 plan for 18 years could have funded the tuition at a public university for four years for a student entering college in 1997, the same level of investment would not have covered even one year's tuition for a student starting in 2008.

     Thought should be given to other tax-advantaged strategies such as those available under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act ("UGMA") (allowing a donor to place securities in a custodial account for the benefit of a minor child), and the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act ("UTMA") (also authorizing a custodial account for the benefit of a minor but allowing the deposit of assets such as real estate, patents, and royalties). Upon reaching the "age of trust termination" (not necessarily the age of majority), the beneficiary's use of the fund or assets is not restricted. Moreover, a Roth IRA, allowing after-tax dollars to be withdrawn by the owner prior to age 59½ if used for educational purposes, should be added to the mix of options.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 8

Jim Witt—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     A feature of recent U.S. presidential campaigns has been the interest of the press and the public (not to mention the requirements of the law) regarding the finances of those competing for the nomination and, ultimately, for the office itself. A key element of those finances has, of course, been the income tax returns of the various candidates. In this connection, one of the present candidates for the Republican nomination, Carly Fiorina, recently offered reporters who came in person to her campaign headquarters in Virginia the opportunity to review her state income tax returns.

     Ms. Fiorina and her husband had already put their federal income tax returns for 2012 and 2013 online, but it is her state income tax returns that are of special interest. She and her husband were required to file such returns in no fewer than 17 states in 2013, with the couple's connection with some of those states so insubstantial that their tax liability in 11 of the states was less than $250.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 6

Matt McDavitt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     When distributing a probate estate, it is important to determine whether particular assets are tangible or intangible property where the will's language distributes these classes of property to different beneficiaries. While many assets may be sorted based upon common-sense principles, other assets present analytical difficulties. One such problematic asset is gold formed into bars, bullion, and coins. Some laymen would classify these precious metal assets as money, others as collectibles, and it is not intuitive whether such gold objects constitute tangible assets (such as a chair or a computer) or intangible assets (such as bank account deposits or stocks).

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 2

Brad Pettit, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

      A very recent decision by a Florida appellate court illustrates constitutional issues that arise when a state or locality seeks to impose a tax upon sales of goods to out-of-state customers via the Internet. In American Business USA Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 151 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), the court addressed the question of whether Internet sales of flowers, gift baskets, other items of tangible personal property, and prepaid telephone calling arrangements by a corporation that was registered to do business in Florida to out-of-state consumers were subject to the Florida sales tax. The taxpayer in the American Business case objected to taxation of its Internet sales to out-of-state customers on the ground that such taxation violated the Commerce and/or Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The American Business court upheld the State of Florida's taxation of Internet sales of prepaid telephone call cards but rejected the State's taxation of Internet sales of flowers and other tangible goods.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 2

Matt McDavitt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     One problematic issue regarding the administration of probate or intestate estates is that in which the property of mentally or physically incapacitated persons is found to have been significantly depleted through lifetime transfers in the period just prior to death. The Virginia Supreme Court recently addressed this problem, establishing that where such lifetime transfers benefit persons standing in a confidential relationship to the grantor, a rebuttable presumption of fraud arises so as to protect decedent estates from the depredations by third parties upon whom the decedent relied at the end of life.

Jim Witt, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     A real property tax assessment dispute involving a large parcel of land in Ulster County, New York, 75 miles north of Manhattan in the Hudson Valley, has recently been settled. The case is of interest for two reasons: (1) It brings into focus the issue of assessed value as based on the uniqueness of the property versus assessed value based on comparable properties in the area; and (2) the property is owned by a Trust on behalf of the actor Robert De Niro and his family.

     The property, well over 50 acres, is located in the town of Gardiner, New York, and has frontage on the Wallkill River (a tributary of the Hudson). The property was acquired in 1997 for $1.5 million, when its main structure was an 18th-century farmhouse, supplemented later by barns. Under De Niro's ownership, the house was renovated to include six bedrooms and seven bathrooms; one barn was converted into a 14,000-square-foot recreation center, containing a game room, gym, basketball court, swimming pool, boxing ring, and small film studio. Another barn was converted into a workshop and another into an office. Also there were $1 million in landscaping expenses to block any view of the property from the road.