The Lawletter Vol 40 No 5

Alistair Edwards, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

      Recently, in Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., No. 14-cv-3555 (ADS)(GRB), 2015 WL 1189579 (E.D.N.Y. signed Mar. 16, 2015), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that an African-American apartment resident had a plausible claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability based on the harassing behavior of a next-door neighbor tenant. In that case, the plaintiff's next-door neighbor, among other things, repeatedly made racially offensive comments and threats to the plaintiff, which conduct led at one point to the neighbor's arrest for aggravated harassment. Despite the plaintiff's complaints to the property management company in charge of the apartment complex, the management company took little action to address the plaintiff's complaints.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 4

Brett Turner, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     A recent Utah Supreme Court decision sets forth a good example of how not to use out-of-state authority when writing an appellate brief on a question of first impression. Johnson v. Johnson, 2014 UT 21, 330 P.3d 704.

     In a divorce case, the court issued an order dividing the husband's military pension, but the wife never obtained the qualified order necessary to have the military pay a portion of the pension directly to her. Some years after the divorce, she petitioned for such an order. The husband argued that she had waited too long, and that her request was barred by laches. The trial court prospectively granted the wife's request, and the husband appealed.

     There was no Utah authority directly on point, so the husband cited two New York cases. The court was not unwilling to look outside Utah, but it criticized the manner in which the New York cases had been discussed, and ultimately dismissed the laches issue on grounds of insufficient briefing.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 4

Mark Rieber, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

      In Commonwealth v. Canning, 28 N.E.3d 1156 (Mass. 2015), the court held as a matter of first impression that with the Commonwealth's new medical marijuana law ("the Act") in effect, if the police seek a warrant to search a property where they suspect an individual is cultivating or possesses marijuana, then they must first offer information sufficient to provide probable cause to believe that the individual is not properly registered under the Act to possess or cultivate the suspected substance. The court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that any cultivation of marijuana remained illegal even under the Act. That argument further asserted that to the extent that the Act permits a limited class of properly licensed or registered persons to grow marijuana, the existence of a license or registration is an affirmative defense for a defendant charged with unlawful cultivation to raise at trial—the Commonwealth is not obligated to disprove such a status in, or to conduct a search at the outset of, the investigation.

The Lawletter Vol 40, No 4

Dora Vivaz, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     The procedural requirements and burdens for showing race discrimination in employment are by now fairly well delineated and established. This is apparently not yet so for claims of reverse discrimination. In a recent case, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, faced with such a claim, first noted that there is a split amongst the circuits as to whether the same requirements and burdens apply to reverse discrimination claims as apply to discrimination claims. Shomo v. Apple, Inc., Civ. Act. No.: 7:14cv00040, 2015 WL 777620, at *4 n.3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 24, 2015). The court referenced McNaught v. Virginia Community College System, 933 F. Supp. 2d 804, 817-20 (E.D. Va. 2013), which includes a detailed discussion of the subject and outlines the circuit split on the issue.

The Lawletter Vol 40, No 4

Tim Snider, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

      Very few principles of federal appellate practice are more fundamental than that only final judgments may be appealed. Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009). That said, bankruptcy presents a unique situation, in that often adversary proceedings finally conclude the dispute between and among the parties to those proceedings and thus are appealable, even though the entire bankruptcy case may not yet be concluded. Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 657 n.3 (2006) ("Congress has long provided that orders in bankruptcy cases may be immediately appealed if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case.").

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 3

Brad Pettit, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

      The motion picture industry has produced many horror or suspense films that are centered on the theme of an individual or couple who purchase a dream house, only to subsequently discover, by way of terrifying sights, sounds, and other stimuli, that a gruesome event once occurred on the property. In a courtroom drama sequel to those movies, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania made it clear that the occurrence of a murder/suicide or similar tragic event inside a house does not constitute a "material defect" therein that must be disclosed by a seller to a purchaser. Milliken v. Jacono, 103 A.3d 806 (Pa. 2014), as modified on reconsideration (Nov. 12, 2014). Accordingly, the Milliken court held that a real property seller's failure to disclose the occurrence of a murder/suicide inside a house to a buyer thereof did not constitute actionable fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or violations of unfair trade practices, consumer protection, and real estate sales disclosure laws. In short, the Milliken court concluded that "purely psychological stigmas are not material defects" in property that a seller must reveal to a buyer. Id. at 811. The Milliken court's reasons for its decision were as follows:

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 3

John Stone, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     When there is a confrontational encounter between a citizen and a law enforcement officer, it is not uncommon for a charge of disorderly conduct against the citizen to result, sometimes even though there may be no other charge that emanates from the initial reason for the interaction. Some maintain that disorderly conduct charges are too readily leveled against citizens who may be doing no more than questioning, perhaps angrily, why a police officer is taking particular actions. According to that view, a disorderly conduct charge can become a catchall offense too often used to punish someone whose remarks or conduct simply annoy the police officer. On the other hand, there certainly are instances in which the way a citizen reacts to the police crosses the line from protected speech to criminal conduct constituting disorderly conduct. One such example is "fighting words" directed at a police officer.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 3

Sandra Thomas, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     In the first decision in the nation to address the issue, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has held that an Alabama trial court was under no obligation to enforce the covenant-marriage contract entered into between the parties at the time of their marriage in Louisiana where the parties subsequently moved to Alabama and sought a divorce in the Alabama court. Blackburn v. Blackburn, No. 2131043, 2015 WL 1608431 (Ala. Civ. App. Apr. 10, 2015) (not yet released for publication).

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 3

Paul Ferrer, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     The U.S. Supreme Court continues to refine the state-action immunity doctrine first formulated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the Court refused to construe the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade, see 15 U.S.C. § 1, as applying to the anticompetitive conduct of a state acting through its legislature. Rather, the Supreme Court ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade, and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the legislature. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.