The Lawletter Vol 40 No 9

Steve Friedman, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     One of the bedrock principles of American jurisprudence is the freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. I. More recently, the law had mandated that disabled students are to receive certain minimum educational benefits at public expense. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1491o (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("RA")). At times, these two distinct rights may overlap and conflict with one another. As illustrated by two fairly recent cases, however, public schools need not accommodate the student's (or the parents') religious beliefs in providing a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") as required by the IDEA and the RA.

      In M.L. ex rel. Leiman v. Starr, No. PWG-14-1679, 2015 WL 4639569 (D. Md. filed Aug. 3, 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-1977 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2015), the parents of a child with an intellectual disability brought suit against Maryland's Montgomery County Board of Education, alleging that the Board had failed to provide the student with a FAPE as required by the IDEA. The student is part of the Orthodox Jewish community, and, thus, it is very important to his parents that he learn the rules and customs of Orthodox Jewish life. Consequently, the parents sought an individualized education program ("IEP") that placed the student at a private school where the basics of Orthodox Jewish life are a part of the curriculum. Instead, the school district proposed an IEP that placed the student at a public school that did not include instruction on Orthodox Jewish life.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 9

Charlene Hicks, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     For a prevailing party in a civil lawsuit to obtain attorney's fees, he or she must file a motion requesting fees by a statutory deadline. Problematically, however, many state statutes do not specify whether this deadline is tolled by the filing of a postjudgment motion. As a result, counsel may be placed in the awkward position of deciding whether to move for attorney's fees while the losing party's postjudgment motion is pending before the court.

      The effect of a postjudgment motion on the time in which a prevailing party must move for attorney's fees was recently addressed in Barbara Ann Hollier Trust v. Shack, Nos. 63308, 64047, 2015 WL 4656697 (Nev. Aug. 6, 2015). There, the court noted that Rule 54(d) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure requires a prevailing party to move for attorney's fees within 20 days after service of notice of entry of judgment. However, in the case before the court, the losing party filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial before the prevailing party moved for attorney's fees. The prevailing party did not file any motion for attorney's fees until after the court denied the losing party's postjudgment motions.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 8

Brad Pettit, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     In 2014, an Indiana appellate court considered the issue of whether a landlord can enforce a provision in a residential lease contract that seeks to protect it from liability for personal injuries caused by fungus or mold on the leased premises. In Hi-Tec Properties, LLC v. Murphy, 14 N.E.3d 767 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer denied, 20 N.E.3d 851 (Ind. 2014), a tenant who leased an apartment that was below ground level brought suit against her landlord, alleging, inter alia, that mold in the apartment had aggravated her preexisting asthma and caused other injuries. The landlord defended against the tenant's claim by pointing to a clause in the parties' lease agreement that read in pertinent part as follows:

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 8

Brett Turner, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     In In re Marriage of Iqbal & Khan, 2014 IL App (2d) 131306, 11 N.E.3d 1, the two parties, of the Islamic faith, signed a separation agreement ("PNA"). The PNA named a prominent member of the local Islamic community as Counselor. It then provided:

     Husband and Wife agree that an unreasonable divorce (without Counselor's express written approval) is a violation and contrary to the purposes and intents of this agreement, and an unreasonable divorce sought by either party will forfeit their rights to custody of the children and any rights conveyed in this agreement. If either party seeks an unreasonable divorce, they hereby agree to surrender full custody rights to the other, and agree to only reasonable visitation rights to the Children.

Id. ¶ 28, 11 N.E.3d at 10 (quoting PNA).

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 8

Jim Witt—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     A feature of recent U.S. presidential campaigns has been the interest of the press and the public (not to mention the requirements of the law) regarding the finances of those competing for the nomination and, ultimately, for the office itself. A key element of those finances has, of course, been the income tax returns of the various candidates. In this connection, one of the present candidates for the Republican nomination, Carly Fiorina, recently offered reporters who came in person to her campaign headquarters in Virginia the opportunity to review her state income tax returns.

     Ms. Fiorina and her husband had already put their federal income tax returns for 2012 and 2013 online, but it is her state income tax returns that are of special interest. She and her husband were required to file such returns in no fewer than 17 states in 2013, with the couple's connection with some of those states so insubstantial that their tax liability in 11 of the states was less than $250.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 8

Mark Rieber—Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     The Fourth Circuit recently held that the Government's warrantless procurement of historical cell site location information ("CSLI"), for an extended period of time, recorded by the defendant's cell phone service provider, was an unreasonable search in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, even though the CSLI records were kept by cell phone companies in the ordinary course of business. United States v. Graham, Nos. 12-4659 & 12-4825, 2015 WL 4637931 (4th Cir. Aug. 5, 2015). The court stated that the examination of a person's historical CSLI can enable the Government to trace the movements of the cell phone and its user across public and private spaces and thereby discover the private activities and personal habits of the user. Id. at *8.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 7

Sandra Thomas, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     In a recent decision of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, Maryland's intermediate appellate court addressed the question of whether a New York resident could be subject to personal jurisdiction in a Maryland paternity and support action based on his filing of an answer to the original complaint for custody, his request for genetic testing, and his request for discovery. Friedetzky v. Hsia, No. 1187 Sept. Term 2014, 2015 WL 4081290 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 6, 2015).

     The court of special appeals held that "by affirmatively requesting genetic testing in his answer" to the mother's custody petition and "by initiating discovery relating to matters of paternity and child support," the alleged father "triggered the UIFSA [Uniform Interstate Family Support Act] long-arm statute and waived the limited immunity otherwise afforded in a custody proceeding under the UCCJEA [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act]." Id. at *1.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 7

John Stone, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     It is no easy task for a prisoner to succeed on a claim that he was denied medical care in circumstances that violated his federal constitutional rights. Such a cause of action is not simply a prisoner's version of a medical malpractice case but, rather, requires a more demanding showing by the plaintiff. Mere negligence in diagnosis or treatment will not suffice. To state an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment based on deficient medical care, a prisoner must allege an objectively serious medical condition and an official's deliberate indifference to that condition. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). "Deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's serious medical needs occurs when a defendant realizes that a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner exists but then disregards that risk.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 7

Paul Ferrer, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     Federal law permits "civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact" that are pending in different districts to be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation ("MDL"). 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). Another federal statute grants an unsuccessful litigant in a federal district court the right to take an appeal, as a matter of right, from a "final decision" of the district court. Id. § 1291. In Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897 (2015), the Supreme Court decided the question of whether the right to appeal secured by § 1291 is affected when a case is consolidated for MDL pretrial proceedings under § 1407.

The Lawletter Vol 40 No 7

Alistair Edwards, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group

     Under the stranger-to-the-deed rule, a deed with a reservation or exception by the grantor in favor of a third party, a so-called stranger to the deed, does not create a valid interest in favor of that third party. For example, a reservation in a deed purporting to create a life estate in a third party (a stranger) may very well be ineffective. Many jurisdictions still adhere to some form of the stranger-to-the-deed rule.

     What happens, though, when a grantor gives a deed containing a right of first refusal in favor of a third party or parties? In other words, the grantor did not create a right of first refusal in himself but in favor of a stranger to the transaction. The effect of a right of first refusal, also called a preemptive right, is to bind the selling party to not sell without first giving the person holding the right the opportunity to purchase the real property at the price specified. But does the stranger-to-the-deed rule invalidate a right of first refusal given to the third party/stranger?