Lawletter Vol. 51, No. 4

Cassidy Crockett-Verba—Senior Attorney

     Geofence warrants, which allow law enforcement to acquire an individual’s cell phone location data from Google, have been subject to repeated challenges under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unlawful search and seizure. The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed the issue, holding in Chatrie v. United States, 609 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 2193 (2026), that geofence warrants are considered searches under the Fourth Amendment, and that law enforcement must obtain a warrant before using them.

Lawletter Vol. 51 No. 4

Anne Hemenway—Senior Attorney

    On August 13, 2026, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the United States Department of Justice's ("DOJ") complaint against Harvard University, which had been filed on March 20, 2026. United States v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, No. 26-11352-RGS, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181060, 2026 WL 2343193 (D. Mass. Aug. 13, 2026). In that case, the DOJ alleged violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., based on three incidents that took place at Harvard during the 2023-2024 school year. However, the District Court concluded that those incidents were too isolated and episodic to support a noncompliance action under Title VI. While the government attempted to reposition itself and tried to support its claim with other more current violations, the court was not convinced, and granted Harvard's motion to dismiss.

Lawletter Vol. 51, No. 4

Natalie K. Mitchell—Senior Attorney

      The law in Virginia, as with most states, is that a business owner and its invitees have a special relationship in the law, in that the business owner has a duty to its invitees to use ordinary care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. In Peninsula Family Skating Center, Inc. v. Willis, Record No. 1623-25-1, 2026 Va. App. LEXIS 333, 2026 WL 1735148 (June 16, 2026), an unpublished decision, the Virginia Court of Appeals decided whether this duty, or general negligence principles, required the employees of a skating rink to call an ambulance when a skater suffered a medical emergency while on the premises. 2026 Va. App. LEXIS 333, at *7.

Lawletter Vol. 51, No. 4

Nadine Roddy—Senior Attorney

    In a matter of first impression, the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized a self-defense public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Moreno v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 591 P.3d 46 (Colo. 2026).

   The plaintiff in Moreno was a 72-year-old woman who had been working at her employer’s convenience store. A customer approached the register holding several items, including two hunting knives. He placed the knives on the counter and told her to get him a pack of cigarettes. The employee retrieved a pack from the display case behind her and began to ring up the sale. The customer said something to the effect of, “[J]ust give them to me for free.” When the employee refused, the customer picked up the knives and walked around the counter toward the employee, cornering her. She twice told the customer, “[D]on't come back here.” Undeterred, and with knives in hand, he continued to approach; Moreno then extended her arms to protect herself. The customer then grabbed the pack of cigarettes and ran out of the store. He was subsequently arrested, and ultimately pleaded guilty to menacing with a deadly weapon.

Lawletter Vol. 51., No. 4

Matthew McDavitt—Senior Attorney

     When money allocated to a pet care trust is found to be excessive because the value of the trust exceeds the amount reasonably required for its intended use, courts in many states possess statutory authority to reduce or redirect the excess.

    Except as otherwise provided by the express terms of the trust instrument, any excess trust property determined by a court to exceed the amount needed for the animal's care must be distributed according to specific statutory hierarchies. For example, if the settlor is living, the laws of Connecticut, Texas, Virginia, Florida, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Maryland, and Missouri all dictate that the excess must be distributed to the settlor. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-489a; Tex. Prop. Code § 112.037; Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-726; Fla. Stat. § 736.0408; 20 Pa. C.S. § 7738; A.R.S. § 14-10408; Md. Est. & Trusts Code Ann. § 14.5-407; and § 456.4-408, R.S.Mo.

Lawletter Vol. 51, No. 4

Lee Dunham—Senior Attorney

      In Chitlik v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, No. 2025-1804, __ F.4th __, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24000, 2026 WL 2288200 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided a case that may expand the universe of situations in which equitable tolling is an appealing argument for plaintiffs who missed a deadline. In Chitlik, the court addressed whether equitable tolling could excuse the late filing of a petition under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), a federal no-fault system established to compensate individuals who suffer certain vaccine-related injuries. In its decision, the court held that the special master and court of federal claims had applied an improperly demanding standard of diligence and failed to conduct the required case-specific inquiry.

The Lawletter Vol. 51 No. 3

CRIMINAL LAW:  Supreme Court Limits What Is Extraordinary and Compelling for Compassionate Release

Robert Westendorf—Senior Attorney

    In two separate opinions recently handed down, the Supreme Court took a narrow view on what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling” reasons that justify early release. In Fernandez v. United States, No. 24-556, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2295, 146 S. Ct. 1292 (May 28, 2026), the defendant was convicted of murder for hire and sentenced to two life sentences. Id. at *8. Eventually, after his habeas challenge failed, the defendant filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582, which allows district courts to shorten prison sentences for extraordinary and compelling reasons. Id. at *7-11. He argued that he was actually innocent, which warranted a sentence reduction. Id. at *11. The district court agreed and granted the motion, but the Second Circuit reversed. Id. at *11-12. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in an opinion by Justice Barrett that was joined by the other conservative justices, affirmed. Id. at *12-26. The Court noted that collateral attacks on conviction are governed by the habeas statute of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which imposes “tight procedural constraints.” Id. at *13. The defendant’s motion under Section 3582 is “a collateral attack outside the rigorous habeas framework. . . . Challenging the validity of a conviction through a compassionate release motion circumvents the exacting requirements of §2255.” Id. at *15.

The Lawletter Vol. 51 No. 3 

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT: Enough Is Enough: Florida Supreme Court Amends Rules to Combat AI Misuse

Jason Holder—Senior Attorney

     Much like their sister jurisdictions, Florida’s courts have seen an alarming increase in the citation of nonexistent caselaw stemming from the use of generative artificial intelligence by both attorneys and pro se litigants. See, e.g., Goya v. Hayashida, 418 So. 3d 652, 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (Party’s brief cites cases “for the proposition that a party claiming inherited property must provide documents of transfer or other formal proof of inheritance. These cases do not exist, and no cases stand for that proposition or various other contentions in her brief.”); Russell v. Mells, 426 So. 3d 913, 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025) (holding that attorney “fundamentally abdicated” duty to the court and client by submitting a filing without verifying that the three cases cited said what was claimed and referring the matter to the Florida Bar “to proceed as it deems appropriate”); Hessert v. Hessert, No. 6D2026-0121, 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 2188, at *1-2 (6th DCA Mar. 20, 2026) (“[T]he petition filed by Petitioner cites to thirteen cases. Only four of the cited cases both exist and are cited for legal propositions that the cited cases actually represent. Five of the cited cases do not exist. Four of the cited cases are cited for legal propositions that the cited cases do not actually represent.”); Young v. AP, No. 25-CA-352, 2025 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 2476, at *30-32 (Aug. 29, 2025) (hallucinated cases found in motion for leave to amend); Rodriguez v. Baylis, No. 2025-CA-004973-O, 2025 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 2738, at *3-4 (Sept. 10, 2025) (pro se plaintiff appeared to have included artificial intelligence research and an AI platform hallucinated case that did not exist, but concluding that party “made an honest and genuine mistake as a pro se or self-represented litigant without the resources of a licensed attorney lacking any malice or bad faith”). As explained by one judge, “[c]hatbots are going to get better, and that's going to make these problems worse. The question now must be how to address them on the front end.” Gouveia v. Meridian Fin. Invs., LLC, No. 4D2025-0843, 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 2306, at *8, 15 Fla. L. Weekly D 600 (4th DCA Mar. 25, 2026) (Lott, J., concurring).

The Lawletter Vol. 51 No. 3

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: It’s Hard to Attack an Arbitration Award

Paul Ferrer—Senior Attorney

     Attacking an arbitration award is never an easy task. The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, which serves as a model for many similar state arbitration statutes, provides very limited grounds for vacating an arbitrator’s award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (grounds for vacation include that the award was procured by “corruption, fraud, or undue means,” or that the arbitrators were partial, exceeded their powers, or committed certain kinds of misconduct, including refusing to hear pertinent evidence). Other than those grounds, judicial review of an arbitration award is “severely circumscribed”: “A court sits to determine only whether the arbitrator did his job, not whether he did it well, correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether he did it.” Ctr. for Excellence in Higher Educ., Inc. v. Accreditation All. of Career Schs., 166 F.4th 452, 457 (4th Cir. 2026) (quotations omitted). A person aggrieved by an arbitrator’s award on one of the stated grounds may seek relief from the federal district court for the district where the award was made. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(b). In the cited case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit joined the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that a person may not, however, launch a collateral attack on the arbitrator’s award.

The Lawletter Vol. 51 No. 3

PERSONAL INJURY:  What Happens When a Landlord Does Not Make Repairs and a Tenant Is Injured as a Result?

David C. Wagoner—Senior Attorney

      Most states impose statutory duties on landlords to maintain and repair residential premises in habitable condition during a tenancy. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1941 (California); O.C.G.A. § 44-7-13 (Georgia); ALM GL ch. 186, § 19 (Massachusetts); MCLS § 554.139 (Michigan); NY CLS Real Prop. Law § 235-B (New York); 9 V.S.A. § 4457 (Vermont); Va. Code § 55.1-1220 (Virginia); Rev. Code Wash. § 59.18.060 (Washington); W. Va. Code § 37-6-30 (West Virginia); and Wis. Stat. § 704.07 (Wisconsin).